S. T. Coleridge and Platonic Revelation from Within (1)

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要約

S. T. コールリッジと内奥からのプラトン的啓示（1）

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本稿の目的は、コールリッジが主に Marginalia の中で為したカント哲学批評の根拠に流れるプラトニズムを Part 2 で検討する前段階として、先ず、コールリッジにみられるプラトニズムを考察することにある。

コールリッジは、カントがイデアに感覚が得た種々多様な現象間の情報を統覧し、1つの経験を作り上げるための規則的な働きのみを認めたのに対し、プラトンはイデアに自然を生み出していく構成的な働きを認めた、と主張する。コールリッジによると、自然を生成するイデアの働きを重視するプラトニズムでは、霊的なイデアが観て見えるような現象間の存在を認めることができる。それは、ヨハネ1.1でいわれる「神の光」を我々が内在させ、その光を体験する「神に似る」者になりうる可能性を積極的に肯定することになる。

プラトンは、内在のイデアに導かれて行う、「＜神に似る＞ための絶え間ない努力」を通して自らの非力、無知さを思い知り、その結果、目的の真の「実現者」の出現を祈るようにするプロセスを人間のあるべき姿としたとして、コールリッジはプラトニズムを評価しているといえる。コールリッジによると、ソクラテス及びプラトンは、「和解者キリスト」の必要性を暗示しているのである。

またコールリッジは、プラトンが「国家」において全人的な道徳の実践のために、自らの不完全な意志（Θυμός）を理性に従属させ、かつ感覚で捉えた現象を、英知界的イデアを認識するための手段とする精神性（Dianoia）によって感覚を理性に従属させることの重要性を説いた点に、プラトンの偉大さを認めている。

コールリッジは、プラトンの語る Dianoia をシェークスピアが「ハムレット」で説明する“discourse of reason”と同一視する。そして、この理性を補助する意志と感覚に、信仰が加わる時、我々は直観的に内訳の現実としての神の働きかけを捉え、その結果、感覚的感情から、理性に基づく道徳的感情を産み出すという、＜神に似た＞行いをすることができる、と訴えている。


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and the general conception of Understanding, saying that unlike Understanding, Reason is "exempt from all the accidents of Time & Place" and "contain[s] some principle of insight and positive assurance in respect to what is essential."

What did Coleridge mean by essential truths of the Idea produced by the Reason as "a Power"? This paper aims to examine the reason for his describing Platonic ideas as "actual, living, inborn and essential." This will provide a key to examine the characteristics of Coleridge's criticism of Kant's moral and religious philosophy.

Litt[le] is known about Coleridge's evaluation of Kant's Platonic modification of his own stoic moral principle of the 1780's in Religion within the Limits of Reason alone (1793) and "Doctrine of Virtue" in The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). However, I will discuss this matter in part 2 of my "Coleridge and Platonic Revelation from Within." This study will investigate some features of Coleridge's understandings of Platonism.

In a letter to James Gooden in January 1820, Coleridge included Bacon, Leibniz, Shakespeare, Milton, Dante, Michael Angelo and Rafael as Platonists; Dryden and Kant were the Aristotelians, but Coleridge added that in Kant he found "a somewhat nearer approach to the Platonic" (CL V 15). He found the influence of Plato, "a great and astonishing genius" (CL II 675), for instance, in the Kant of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, which led Coleridge to think,

In him [Kant] is contained all that can be learnt—& as to the results, you have a firm faith in God, the responsible Will of Man, and Immortality—& Kant will demonstrate to you, that this Faith is . . . confirmed by the Reason & Understanding . . . .

(CL V 14)

For Coleridge, Platonic elements in Kant's works proved the potentialities of Reason and Understanding for morality and a steadfast faith in God. Coleridge's reading of Kant as a Platonic idealist led him to, in Wordsworth's words, "ma[ke works of Plato and Kant] entirely his own by borrow[ing] largely . . . but . . . giv[ing] away as largely" (TT I 546).

I : Coleridge on Plato/Socrates' feelings toward prayers

Coleridge follows the Kantian distinction between regulative and constitutive ideas. In The Critique of Pure Reason Kant explains that when transcendent ideas of pure reason such as of God, immortality, and free will, are employed constitutively and ideas "seek to bring the existence of appearances under rules a priori" of the understanding (CPR A 179/B 221-222), they do not give rise to truth but illusion, "pseudo-rational, merely dialectical concepts" (CPR A 644/B 672). On the contrary, the regulative principles of understanding derived from sensible perception do not try to create a pseudo-rational illusion. As concepts for knowing perceived objects, the regulative principles yield "rule[s] according to which a unity of experience may arise from perception" (CPR A 180/B 222). In his Critiques Kant held back from discussing, for instance, ideas of the Incomprehensible God which were doomed to be mere dialectical illusions due to man's limited knowledge of the invisible. According to Kant, ideas are regulative in that they offer rules for organizing outward facts on which not the reason but the understanding works to derive cognition from "an intuition" as "a perception, immediate and individual"
It is clear, as Coleridge himself admitted, that his definition of the Understanding as "the faculty of thinking and forming judgments on the notices furnished by the sense" (F I 177) was the same with that of Kant’s (CM III 557). The Understanding as "the science of phaenomena" "concerns itself exclusively with the quantities, qualities, and relations of particulars in time and space" (SM 59) so as to synthesize various representations into one common representation. Coleridge like Kant attributed man’s possibilities of experiences to "rule[s] a priori" of the Understanding that judge "the quantities, qualities, and relations" of particular "materials . . . given by the senses or sensations" (SM 59).

In contrast to Understanding, Reason is "the science of the universal" for Coleridge: "REASON [as] the knowledge of the laws of the WHOLE considered as ONE" "first manifests itself in man by the tendency to the comprehension of all as one" (SM 59, 60). For instance, Coleridge believed that it was the sublime Reason within him that made him realize,

Tis the sublime of man,
Our noontide Majesty, to know ourselves
Parts and proportions of one wondrous whole!
This fraternises man, this constitutes
Our charities and bearings. But 'tis God
Diffused through all, that doth make all one whole . . . .

("Religious Musings," 126-131; PW I 113-114)

It is the Reason that reveals man’s real self as a symbol of a divine component of ‘an infinite whole’ sets his mind at rest (SM 60). And this peace of mind results in the love of neighbors and virtuous deeds.

In The Prelude (1805), a poem addressed to Coleridge (Gill 14-18), Wordsworth drew attention to the most precious working of the Reason which, being closely related to the imagination (Book XIII 166-170), “make”s revelation of “the unity of all” from “things/Which we perceive” (Book II 220-226). Wordsworth wrote,

. . . though the picture [of the mighty city, London] weary out the eye,
By nature an unmanageable sight,
It is not wholly so to him who looks
In steadiness, who hath among least things
An under-sense of greatest, sees the parts
As parts, but with a feeling of the whole.

(Book VII 708-713)

Reason arouses “a feeling of the whole” with which we resist the phenomenal world of Understanding. The constitutive idea of oneness of the Reason leads us to abstract “an undersense of greatness” from observed parts, “from early converse with the works of God” (Book VII 719).

In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge mentioned that Plato adopted the original meaning of the word ἰδέα “used by Pindar, Aristophanes, and in the Gospel of Matthew” (I 97). ἰδέα for Plato “represent[s] the visual abstraction of a distinct object, when we see the
whole without distinguishing its parts" (I 97). If we compare Coleridge's explanation of Plato's Ἰδέα with his remark that "the Reason first manifests itself in man by the tendency to the comprehension of all as one," it becomes clear that Coleridge considered Reason to be the cause of our struggle to realize the aim of Platonic Ἰδέα. It requires the embodiment of "an infinite whole" that exists objectively in and for the Reason subjugating the Understanding and the imagination. Pure Reason gives us an impulse forward to create a calm of the spirit by constructing the ideal "union of the Universal and the Individual" (SM 62) out of particulars in time and space.

In The Republic Plato writes that the idea of good is the reality that "gives [its] truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower" (508 E). In Plato's opinion, the idea of good exercises its Power for helping the knower construct his knowledge and be morally better. "As being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known" (508 E), the idea of good gives its Power to the subject, the knower, and also to his objects of knowledge, which builds up knowledge, namely, "the coincidence of an object with subject" (BL I 252, Schelling 5). Therefore, Coleridge stressed in his Philosophical Lectures that Ideas were "known to be unapproachable as to realization, but they were to be a polar star, guiding a man's mind by approximation" (164).

As quoted above, Coleridge thought that Aristotle as "a Conceptualist . . . never raised himself into that higher state, which was natural to Plato, . . . of the Throne of Actual Ideas or Living, Inborn, Essential Truths." The fact that Plato's Ideas are to remain as "a polar star" suggests that they indicate "a tone of detraction" even in man's "highest experience of practical life" (P Lects 164). Living ideas always let "the mind . . . feel itself greater than aught it has done" (P Lects 166), greater than the ideal symbol of "one wondrous whole" that the senses are allowed to grasp.

Coleridge thought that by raising himself above Aristotelian concepts of Understanding by visualizing an infinite whole, Plato indicated man's wise awareness of the essential truths concerning the necessity of the heavenly help for his complete union with the good. According to Coleridge, "the highest and best men" feel

... an impulse from their reason a necessity to seek an unity; and those who felt wisely, like Plato and Socrates, feeling the difficulties of this, looked forward to that Being, of whom this necessity and their reason was a presentiment, to instruct them, and expected with reverence and hope that an instructor would come.

(P Lects 129)

Coleridge referred to Socrates' remark in his discourse, The Apology: The Defense of Socrates at his Trial, that "Human wisdom is of little or no value" (23 A). Socrates criticized the sophists who taught the citizens of Athens for pay, regarding themselves as wise. Socrates advanced his opinion to Chaerephon, who had been to Delphi and heard the Oracle that Socrates was the wisest, saying that the Oracle

... does not really say this of Socrates, but merely uses my name, and makes me an example, as if he were to say: "This one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, recognizes that he is in truth of no account in respect to wisdom."

(The Apology 23 A-B)
Man's wisdom should be based on the consciousness of his own ignorance. The sophists' pride incapacitates their inborn feeling of Reason which appeals for the need of supernatural help to accumulate true wisdom.

In Coleridge's reading of Plato, Socratic confession of "ignorance" (P Lects 164) would lead one to note that union with the Supreme Being as the final aim of man could not be fulfilled without its close approximation to us:

Plato had taught men that after going through all the highest exertions of the faculties which nature had given them, cultivating their senses, their understandings, their reason and their moral powers, yet still there was a ground wanting, a something that could not be found within the sphere of their knowledge. Yet knowledge led men to ask for that ground, and this he placed in the Supreme Being as the final result of all human effort and human reasoning. (P Lects 241)

Coleridge focused on Plato's emphasis on the incomprehensible heavenly help needed for our ongoing rational search for the Supreme Being. From his viewpoint, Platonism and Christianity share certain similarities: both aim to "make us fit for Heaven and to make our future state work upon us as a motive for our exertion in the present" (P Lects 243).

“Our future state” here means “the great design of our redemption from the form of the evil one, and of our second creation or birth in the divine image” (AR 40).

Coleridge wrote Aids to Reflection for those whose concern was the cultivation of “a manly character . . . on the several grounds of prudence, morality and religion,” and also for those who agreed with the author's principle of life that “the Christian Faith . . . is the perfection of human intelligence” (AR 6). And it was in Aids to Reflection that he mentioned Platonism like Christianity “commence[s] with the prudential, . . . ascends to the moral, . . . and seeks its summit in the imitation of the Divine nature” (40-41). Calling the last stage of imitation “the Spiritual,” Coleridge wrote that "Moral Goodness is other and more than Prudence, or the Principle of Expediency; and [spiritual] Religion more and higher than Morality" (AR 8). Platonic “inward acts and aspirations, waitings, and watchings, which have a growth in godlikeness . . . [through] the union of the human soul with the Supreme Good" (AR 41), they all belong to the Spiritual Religion. Prudence and Morality should be the subordinates of the Spiritual Being in Aids to Reflection.

In Thaetetus, Plato gives a definition of God:

God is in no wise and in no manner uprighteous, but utterly and perfectly righ
teous, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in turn becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness. It is herein that the true cleverness of a man is found and also his worthless and cowardice. . . . (176 C)

Plato suggests that “inward acts and aspirations, waitings, and watchings, which have a growth in godlikeness” are essential for us to “escape from earth to the dwelling of the Gods as quickly as we can” so as to become “righteous and holy and wise” like God (Thaetetus 176 B). Plato expresses the view that “what we are” should take precedence over “what we do” morally. In other words, man's inner spiritual reality plays a more vital role than actions in trying to become godlike.
In Coleridge's words, "what we are" covers

. . . all the acts, exercises, and disciplines of mind, will, and affection, that are requisite or conducive to the great design of our redemption from the form of the evil one, and of our second creation or birth in the divine image. (AR 40)

I would like to stress here that "all the acts, exercises, and disciplines of mind, will, and affection" means, for Coleridge, the in-depth self-examination of "what we are" with the Reason as "a super-sensuous organ" or an "inward eye" (F I 156). By doing so, we come to realize our innate impulse to desire that of which we feel ourselves defective.10 The lasting self-awareness of ignorance excites man's ceaseless wish to accumulate wisdom and become God-like. Only by means of self-reflection, does one come to realize a sort of spirit of prayer within, that asks for the help of the Supreme to strengthen his "mind, will and affection" to be a better man.

Coleridge wrote that

. . . Plato began in meditation, thought deeply within himself of the goings-on of his own mind and of the powers that there were in that mind, conceived to himself how this could be . . . and then looked abroad to ask if this were a dream, or whether it were indeed a revelation from within, and a waking reality.

(P Lects 186)

In my understanding, what Coleridge thought of as Plato's intention was to shed light on the workings of daemons11 that transmit gods' massage to man and man's prayers to gods in return. For instance, in Timaeus, it is said that to be "supremely blessed," man has to be "for ever tending his divine part and duly magnifying that daemon who dwells along with him" (90 C). In consequence, we can proclaim,

. . . God has given to each of us, as his daemon, that kind of soul which is housed in the top of our body and which raises us—seeing that we are not an earthly but a heavenly plant—up from earth towards our kindred in the heaven.

(Timaeus 90 A)

As a headnote to Chapter 13 of Biographia Literaria (I 295), Coleridge quoted a passage from Milton's Paradise Lost V 469-8812 in which Milton referred to the quotation above from Timaeus 90 A. Coleridge indicated his wishes to be like a plant in Appendix C of The Statesman's Manual: "But what the plant is, by an act not its own and unconsciously—that must thou make thyself to become! must by prayer and by a watchful and unresisting spirit . . . " (71) and "O!—if as the plant to the orient beam, we would but open out our minds to that holier light . . . " (73). What makes us turn to the heavenly light and speed up the wholesome growth toward the source of the light is the act of prayers for Coleridge. And what leads us to prayers to the Invisible is "the REASON without being either the SENSE, the UNDERSTANDING or the IMAGINATION contains all three within itself" (SM 69). The function of such Reason as the control of the sense, the Understanding and the imagination is closely related to that of daemon described by Socrates and Plato.

Daemon or the infinite within as a god-given guardian spirit for Plato means "half-god and half-man," and its function is,
Interpreting and transporting human things to the gods and divine things to men; entreaties and sacrifices from below, and ordinances and requitals from above: being midway between, it makes each to supplement the other, so that the whole is combined in one. . . . God with man does not mingle: but the spiritual is the means of all society and converse of men with gods and of gods with men, whether waking or asleep. (The Symposium 202 E-203 A)

The state of mind that is glad to offer “entreaties and sacrifices from below” is a condition for the reconciliation of men and gods. Plato attributed the reason of our impulse to offer supplications to the infinite within man that lets him realize his need and, at the same time, his incompetence to further his inward health. Therefore, for Platonists, man’s Reason contains “a Power” to lead us to a self-examination to make us fit to receive an influence from Ideas that guide us as a polar star. Reason impregnated into the plant supports its vital power to grow higher, though unconsciously, to receive much sunlight.

The prayer of Socrates in Plato’s Phaedrus proves his belief in the need for supernatural aids to improve him:

Phaedrus: . . . but now let us go, since the heat has grown gentler.
Socrates: Is it not well to pray to the deities here before we go?
Phaedrus: Of course.
Socrates: O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant to me that I be made beautiful in my soul within, and that all external possessions be in harmony with my inner man. May I consider the wise man rich; and may I have such wealth as only the self-restrained man can bear or endure. —Do we need anything more, Phaedrus? —For me that prayer is enough. (Phaedrus 279 B-C)

For Coleridge, the greatness of Plato and Socrates is that they admit that God-likeness, or immortality as fully as is permitted to men on earth, can not be attained without the help of “the Realizer” and hence without prayers to “the Realizer.” Thus Coleridge advises us to

. . . look first to a purer ideal with a desire of connecting with it (which is equally taught by Plato) reality, and which Plato himself, or at least Socrates, told us could only be done by the Realizer, by Him who was the fountain of all and who in the substance superseded the shadow—I mean the <Founder of the> Christian religion. (P Lects 169)

Coleridge wrote in The Friend that not by the Understanding but “by the pure REASON . . . we become possessed of principle, (the eternal verities of Plato and Descartes) and of ideas . . . [which is] more than once expressed, and every where supposed, in the writings of St. Paul” (I 177). In Coleridge’s reading of St. Paul, the Pure Reason as “the Realizer” beautifies us and enables us to “bring good tidings of good things, that publishes peace, . . . bring glad tidings of good things, that publishes salvation” (Isaiah 52:7 or Romans 10:17 referred to in SM 92).
If we regard Ideas as constitutive and as Nature's power and life, we can say that, by means of pure Reason and imagination, we awake to Ideas, "the eternal verities of Plato" and are able or allowed to proclaim the Lord, His peace and salvation. As respects the faculty of Pure Reason, Coleridge, unlike Kant, admits its power to partake in divine Justice and Will.

Coleridge, referring to Romans 8:23 where St. Paul says that "having the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body," insisted on the possibility of our assimilation into our God-given "power, namely, of retiring into that image, which is its substantial form and true life" (SM 90). "We receive the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father;" Coleridge quoted from Romans 8:15. He stressed that we pray intensely, by means of the inborn Spirit of prayer, that "we may seek within us, what we can never find elsewhere, that we may find within us what no words can put there" (SM 92-3). This spirit of prayer within is derived from the concept of constitutive Ideas, i.e., "inner man" in the Platonic tradition. Coleridge tried to remind his readers of Christ's words to the Pharisees in Luke 17:21, "Neither shall they say, Lo here! Or, lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you" (SM 92 n).

"The kingdom of God within" or "the Realizer" of our wish to "be partakers of the divine nature" (2 Peter 1:4) means the pure Reason that produces "actual, living, inborn and essential" Ideas of God that enlighten us in regard to active, intense prayers for God's help. For Coleridge, Reason should be

... the integral spirit of the regenerated man, reason substantiated and vital, "one only, yet manifold, overseeing all, and going through all understanding; the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence from the glory of the Almighty; which remaining in itself regeneratest all other powers, and in all ages entering into holy souls maketh them friends of God and prophets;" (Wisdom of Solomon, c. vii) ... (SM 69)

Andrew Lowth in his Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys says that

The mystical strand in Platonism ... develops from th[e] notion of man's essentially spiritual nature, from the belief of his kinship with the divine. But, for Christianity, man is a creature; he is not ultimately God's kin, but created out of nothing by God and only sustained in being by dependence of His will. ... At this point Christianity and Platonism are irreconcilable ... (xiv)

Lowth says that Christianity and Platonism are irreconcilable in that for the former, man is not spiritual by nature. However, for Coleridge, the words of St. Paul that "We receive the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father" (SM 90) indicate that St. Paul like Plato admitted the possibility of our becoming possessed of the spiritual (F 1 177) in our prayers that "we may seek within us, what we can never find elsewhere" (SM 92).

Socrates' remark on his own ignorance, Plato's search for the ever-progressive method of self-development to the incomprehensible Supreme Good, and additionally,
Plato’s “dim conception of the necessity of a Divine Mediator” (AR 41) for that search, suggest that, at least for Coleridge, Platonism and Christianity are reconcilable. Both of them stress the significance of “a watchful and unresisting spirit” culminating in prayers, as the only mean with which we can communicate with the Absolute despite the unbridgeable gap.

II : Coleridge and Plato’s idea of psychic harmony

In his article “Recollection and Recovery, Coleridge’s Platonism,” Keith Cunliff points out that in 1800 and 1801 Coleridge realized the significance of Plato and Kant’s philosophy for confronting British empiricists such as Locke, Hume, and Hartley (208). In Appendix C of The Statesman’s Manual (67) and in Aids to Reflection (79), Coleridge accepted as true the aphorism of the Aristotelians, “Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu,” “a tag in European philosophy as a result of De anima (SM 67 n), as true. However, he explained, “Locke erred only in taking half the truth for a whole Truth” (AR 79). “Representable in the forms of Time and Space,” namely, conceptions derived from mere Understanding are “included in the Mechanism of Cause and Effect” in Nature.

Materials supplied by the senses to Understanding are limited to those of Nature, so the mysterious peace of God, that “cannot be contemplated in any forms of space and time” or in any forms of “Cause and Effect” (AR 80), “passeth all understanding” (Phil 4.7/SM 67).

Coleridge demonstrated that something spiritual that “has its principle in itself, so far as to originate its actions” is related to the Will and is to be “understood under the name of Morality; or the Moral State” (AR 80). “By spiritual I do not pretend to determine what the Will is, but what it is not—namely, that it is not Nature,” so Coleridge wrote. He emphasized the importance of noting the true existence of the constitutive Idea in our mind that controls from the “higher state” the mechanism of perception and Understanding.

In Coleridge as Philosopher Muirhead mentioned that Coleridge’s religious philosophy was

. . . to combine the Platonic theory of the world as an expression of the Divine Ideas, of reason as their reflection in our minds, and of religion as the wrap contemplation of them, so reflected, on which the early English Platonists had mainly dwelt, with a voluntaristic theory of being and of the knowledge of it, largely Kantian, finally with a psychology essentially his own.

I recognize the importance of Muirhead’s assertion that attributes Coleridge’s voluntaristic view of man chiefly to the philosophy of Kant. However, Coleridge regarded “Triunity, in Reason, Religion, and the Will” in Plato’s Republic as a symbol of an ideal man (SM 62), and that Coleridge equated the WILL actuating the coexistence of reason and religion with the Platonic Θυμός (Thumos, SM 65) suggests that the Will (Θυμός) explained in Plato should also be discussed to analyze Coleridge’s theories of man’s will and emotion that greatly affects the will.

Coleridge mentioned in a philosophical lecture, that unlike Aristotle who “began
with the sensual,” Plato “sought in that which is above our senses, he sought in the thinking power itself, and still further, in the power of will revealed to us by our moral being” (P Lect 186).

Coleridge had a high opinion of Plato’s Republic:

There exists in the human being, at least in man fully developed, no mean symbol of Tri-unity, in Reason, Religion, and the Will. For each of the three, though a distinct agency, implies and demands the other two, and loses its own nature at the moment that from distinction it passes into division or separation. The perfect frame of a man is the perfect frame of a state: and in the light of this idea we must read Plato’s REPUBLIC.

Also he wrote, “Plato’s Republic is like Bunyan’s Town of Man-Soul, —a description of an individual, all of whose faculties are in their proper subordination and inter-dependence. . . .” (LR II 179, SM 63 n). Coleridge agreed with the Platonism of The Republic that regarded the idea of psychic harmony or interdependence as an essential quality for the perfection of a man.

Precisely speaking, in The Republic Plato modified his idea of the psyche in Phaedo. In Phaedo, psyche, man’s soul as the basis of the individual life, is explained as impure though it animates the body. Due to the incarnation, the psyche is tainted; thus man should try to detach his soul from the lusts of the flesh (Phaedo 80 E-81 A).

In book IV of The Republic, however, the psyche comes to be divided into three parts: the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive (440 E-441 A). The rational part of the soul is that “whereby it reckons and reasons the rational.” The appetitive or the irrational part is that “with which it loves, hungerers, thirsts, and feels the flutter and tillation of other desires;” the appetitive is “companion of various replettions and pleasures” (439 D). The Θυμός or “principle of high spirit, that with which we feel anger” is regarded as the third form, the spirited part, existing in the soul (439 E).

Plato’s Θυμός is “the power of noble wrath” (Republic 439 E n), noble in that it is “the helper of reason by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nature” (441 A); “in the fractions of the soul, it [Θυμός] much rather marshals itself on the side of the reason” (440 E). Contrary to the constant depreciation of anger by the Stoics, Plato admits the workings of rational anger depicted for example in Homer’s Odyssey:

He smote his breast and chided thus his heart,

‘Endure, my heart, for worse hast thou endured.

(Odyssey XX 17-18 quoted in Phaedo 94 D)

In Phaedo, Socrates explains that Homer did not “th[ink] of the soul as a harmony which would be led by the conditions of the body” (94 E). Harmony between the soul and the body cannot be achieved. In Phaedo, Odysseus’ self-accusation represents the soul’s predominance in the conflict with the body. But in The Republic, the same passage is seen as an example of the inner conflict in the soul between the rational part which “reflect[s] about the better and the worse,” and the appetitive which produces “unreasoning anger” (441 C) associated with the body.

In the three subdivisions of the soul, the Θυμός, by nature, is to “give[e] battle, at-
tending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the ruler’s designs” (442 B). The ruler means the reason (442 C), and that which fulfills bravely the command of the reason regardless of the pains and pleasures of the body is the Ὄμος as “the helper of reason” (441 A).

Repressing the appetite for wealth, the reason and the Ὄμος makes man “a unit, one man instead of many, self-controlled and in unison” (443 E). “The whole man’ as such is appropriate for the foundation of the state. Plato, thus, takes notice of the role of the Ὄμος in realization of justice. In other words, what saves man from “injustice and licentiousness and cowardice and brutish ignorance” (444 C) caused by “the revolt of [the appetitive] part against the whole of the soul” (444 B) is the power of the Ὄμος of choosing the rational as the ruling principle to uphold morality as a coherent whole.

Injustice from a split in the soul indicates the weakness of the Ὄμος, as the result of which, in Coleridge’s words, “proper subordination [to the reason] and interdependence” among three principles of the soul (reason, religion and the will) cannot be maintained. On injustice in The Republic, it is said in History of Philosophy that

. . . Plato has gone beyond Socrates in making room for the possibility of weakness of the will. For Plato, it is possible, in the case of an individual with an unjust soul, to know what is good for one and yet fail to do it. Someone whose soul is not properly ordered, whose appetite, for example, is ruling rather than his or her reason, may succumb to the desire to drink the liquid even when he or she knows it is poisoned. (41)

Plato sees how the situation stands in which the man acts against what he believes, against what his reason commands. And he thinks that man’s inner conflict between the rational and the appetitive originates in the weakness of the Ὄμος.

Consider now the implications of Coleridge’s thinking of the will as the Platonic Ὄμος. He writes in The Statesman’s Manual that reason actuated by the will produces wisdom frequently found in the Old Testament, while religion actuated by will produces love found in the New Testament (65). This is God’s infinite love that redeems our sinfulness. And the weakness of the will is Original Sin for Coleridge. He wrote in his letter to George Coleridge in 1798:

I believe most steadfastly in original Sin; that from our mothers’ wombs our understandings are darkened; and even where our understandings are in the Light, that our organization is depraved, & our volitions imperfect; and we sometimes see the good without wishing to attain it, and oftener wish it without the energy that wills & performs—And for this inherent depravity, I believe, that the Spirit of the Gospel is the sole cure . . . . (CL I 396)

Coleridge thought of volition as a faculty that made his will strong enough to put the dictates of the Reason concerning his morality and religion into practice, and he attributed his “utter impotence of the Volition” (UL II 109) to laudanum:

By the long long Habit of the accursed Poison my Volition (by which I mean the faculty instrumental to the Will, and by which alone the Will can realize itself—it’s Hands, Legs, & Feet, as it were) was completely deranged . . . . (CL III 489)
Coleridge had been taking opium as a remedy for rheumatism\(^1\) ever since entering Jesus College, Cambridge (Hanson 29; UL I 3). And, to his great sorrow, he came to realize a harsh reality that opium as a detested poison infringed on his God-given rights to "act as a free agent . . ., finally determining his conduct by his own Will, according to his own Conscience" (F I 190). Coleridge in 1814 blamed himself acutely, saying that sins committed against his Will were "ingratitude to [his] Maker for the wasted Talents; . . . ingratitude to so many friends who have loved [him he] know[s] now why; . . . barbarous neglect of [his] family" (CL III 490). All of these sins were unbearable to him. He experienced the same anxiety as that of St Paul's that "what I would, that I do not; but what I hate, that do I" (Romans 7:15):

Pray always, says the Apostle;\(^7\) —that is, have the habit of prayer turning your thoughts into acts by connecting them with the idea of the redeeming God.

(CN III 4183)

And Coleridge wrote the difficulty of saying a prayer at will:

O! who ever prayed, that has not an hundred times felt that scarce an act of Life was so difficult as to determine to pray? Effective resolve to Heart-amendment must have commenced, before true Prayer can be uttered . . . .

(CM III 267-8)

Opium let Coleridge confirm opinions of Plato and St Paul on a sad reality that with the volition or Platonic \(\Theta_{\omega}\)\(\iota\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\) indifferent to the Reason, man could not help acting against his or her rational judgement. Such being the case, it seems reasonable to think that Coleridge regarded Plato's prayers to gods as an indication of his "dim conception of the necessity of a Divine Mediator" (AR 41) who would help him become "most nearly perfect in righteousness" (*Theaetetus* 176 C).

Coleridge, however, believed that man can be Godlike "not by Will of man alone: but neither without the Will" (AR 158). He took up the danger of "satanic pride and rebellious self-idolatry" caused by the Will "in its utmost abstraction" from Reason and Religion (SM 65). In other words, the Will of the Satan in *Paradise Lost* represents

... the fearful resolve to find in itself alone the one absolute motive of action, under which all other motives from within and from without must be either subordinated or crushed.

(SM 65)

Therefore, "the symbol of Tri-unity, in Reason, Religion, and the Will" depicted in Plato's *Republic* represents "the pure untroubled brightness of an IDEA, that most glorious birth of the God-like within us" (SM 50). And this Tri-unity is required for our intuitive apprehension of "the Spirit of Truth:"

Where, if not in Christ, is the Power that can persuade a Sinner to return, that can bring home a Heart to God?

Common mercies of God, though they have a leading faculty to repentance, (Rom. ii. 4) yet, the rebellious heart will not be led by them . . . .

COMMENT

By the phrase "in Christ," I mean all the supernatural Aids vouchsafed and conditionally promised in the Christian Dispensation: and among them the Spirit of Truth, which the world cannot receive, were it only that the knowledge of *spiritual*
Truth is of necessity immediate and intuitive . . . (AR 157-158)
The will of the knower to try to grasp "the Spirit of Truth" "immediate[ly] and intuitive [ly]," no matter how imperfect his or her volition may be, is a requirement to receive the aid of Heaven. For Coleridge, the individual will to receive passively "the supernatural Aids" and the will to assimilate ourselves actively to "the Spirit of Truth" prove the "Tri-unity, in Reason, Religion, and the Will" since such a Will aims at subordination into the Will of God as the "other motive from within and without."

Coleridge in *Biographia Literaria* and in *The Statesman's Manual* compared religion to the sun:

> Ere he [the sun] is fully arisen, and while his glories are still under veil, he calls up the breeze to chase away the usurping vapours of the night-season, and thus converts the air itself into the minister of its own purification: not surely in proof or elucidation of the light from heaven, but to prevent its interception. (BL II 243)

Wisdom or love derived from the "Tri-unity, in Reason, Religion, and the Will" gets ready for absorbing the heavenly light. Wisdom or love eliminates any hindrance to be a messenger of truth and beauty. Religion quickens our receptiveness and cultivates the power of searching and reflecting on the light from heaven, even though it remains beyond understanding. However, true wisdom or love born of Pure Reason leads man to know the joy of undergoing "THE PEACE OF GOD THAT PASSETH ALL UNDERSTANDING" (Phil 4: 7, SM 67). Faith enlivens the power of Christ's "Spirit in the inner man" (Ephesians 3: 16, SM 48). In consequence, we come to experience "a spiritual sensation" of "the peace of God" by the conscience awakened by "the coincidence of the human will with reason and religion" (SM 66-67).

Only in the conscience is man's passiveness to God's peace seen as "an act of passiveness," which results in "the consciousness of responsibility" to foster "a spiritual sensation" ("Essay on Faith," SW II 836). Faith stimulates the constitutive Ideas within to create "a spiritual sensation" of "the peace of God." This means, for Coleridge, to "be God-like" because he wrote that to become

... a second creator of himself & of his own happiness or misery and in this ... the image of his Maker [is] impressed upon him. (Lect 1808-1819, 315)

Through wisdom or love of our own making that, like the sun, "actuates the life of nature, but who at the same time ... makes all objects glorious on which he looks, and by that glory visible to others" (SM 48), we can enter into intuitive communication of "the peace of God" with others:

From God's Love through his Son, crucified for us from the beginning of the world, Religion begins: and in Love towards God and the creatures of God it hath its end and completion. O how heaven-like it is to sit among brethren at the feet of a minister who speaks under the influence of Love and is heard under the same influence! ... And O! how beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace, that bringeth glad tidings of good things, that publisheth salvation; that saith unto the captive soul, Thy God reigneth! (SM 92)
It is such a heaven-like situation as described above that the Ancient Mariner after the voyage is destined to look for. For Coleridge’s “empirical transcendentalism” (Wendling 12), one of the great purpose of Christianity is

... the habit of attaching all our conceptions and feelings, and of applying all the words and phrases expressing reality, to the objects of senses; more accurately speaking, to the images and sensations by which their presence is made known to us. (AR 406)

In The Rime, the Mariner’s responsibility after the voyage is to “teach” (590) others the existence of the Invisible Presence that made him sense a wind that had brought him back to his native port as “a welcoming:"

It mingled strangely with my fears,
Yet it felt like a welcoming.

..................
We drifted o'er the harbor bar,
And I with sobs did pray—
O let me be awake, my God!
Or let me sleep alway. (458-59/468-471; PW I 204)

The Mariner comes to realize the importance of prayers that awaken and strengthen

That, which we find in ourselves .... Without this latent presence of the “I am,” all modes of existence in the external world would flit before us as colored shadows, with no greater depth, root, or fixture, than the image of a rock hath in a gliding stream or the rain-bow on a fast-sailing rain-storm. (SM 78)

During the voyage as the Man of Understanding who was far from the Platonic “Trinity, in Reason, Religion, and the Will,” the Mariner could not express “the love of God, and therefore God himself who is Love” (SM 91) by means of his love for the Albatross the crew “hailed ... in God’s name” (66, PW I 189). The Mariner, until his admiration of the supernatural beauty of the watersnakes as “a flash of golden fire” (281) made by “God’s creatures of the great calm” (the Gloss), could not grasp the harmony between “[his] soul in agony” (235), “the Spirit of Truth” within himself, and “the creatures of the calm” (the Gloss). Dissociating himself from the harmonious Whole the Reason apprehends, though unconsciously, the Mariner was overwhelmed with loneliness and a penchant for self-destruction:

Alone, alone, all, all alone.
Alone on a wide wide sea!
And never a saint took pity on
My soul in agony.

The many men, so beautiful!
And they all dead did lie:
And a thousand thousand slimy things
Lived on; and so did I.

................
I looked to heaven, and tried to pray;  
But or ever a prayer had gusht,  
A wicked whisper came, and made  
My heart as dry as dust.  

The Mariner preserves a vivid recollection of himself as a separated, practically dead person, devoid of the heart praying for heavenly guidance:  
O Wedding-Guest! this soul hath been  
Alone on a wide wide sea:  
So lonely 'twas, that God himself  
Scarce seemed there to be.  

And the Mariner explains to the Wedding Guest that his blessing of the watersnakes with “A spring of love gushed from [his] heart” (284) had been realized owing to “[his] kind saint [who had taken] pity on [him]” (286). But by repeating the phrase “And I blessed them unaware” (285, 287), the Mariner puts special emphasis on the fact that even though he had convinced of the supernatural aid, its workings and the reason for his capability for a prayer has remained incomprehensible.

In “The Eolian Harp,” the poet due to a word of reproof by his wife, Sara, amends his former opinion concerning God:  
For never guiltless may I speak of him,  
The Incomprehensible! save when with awe  
I praise him, and with Faith that inly feels;  
Who with his saving mercies heal’d me,  
A sinful and most miserable man . . . .  

The poet’s deep awe for the Presence of a mystery “Who with his saving mercies healed [him]” cultivates his “Faith that inly feels.” And for Coleridge, it is this self-made feelings for the need of faith in the absolute existence, grasped intuitively by the Reason, that leads man to be God-like, to the Platonic revelation from within. The Mariner is destined to strive for becoming “a second creator of himself & of his own happiness or misery” so as to imitate “the image of his Maker” in his prayers of thanks for God’s impartial love for sinners. The Mariner feels that his “heart within [him] burns” (585) when he tells his story; he feels something that assists him to be “a second creator [as a speaker]. . . of his own happiness or misery.” The method to “feel within [himself] a something ineffably greater than [his] own individual nature” that induces our prayers to the Incomprehensible is, in Coleridge’s opinion, what “in the earlier ages seized the nobler minds” (F I 514) like those of Socrates and Plato.

III: Platonic awakening of truth by “the Triunity in Reason, Religion, and the Will”

Coleridge wrote “Essays on the Principles of Method,” in which he discussed “METHOD of the will” (F I 523) “as employed in the formation of the understanding, and in the constructions of science and literature” (F I 449). For Coleridge, it is how to conquer Phenomena by “reduc[ing] Phenomena to Principles” (F I 511). Phenomena just
build up "abstract knowledge, or the science of the mere understanding" which "belongs to us as finite beings." (F I 520-521). It is abstract in that it "ends in perplexity," "the negations of reality." According to Coleridge, negating true reality enables us to experience "an eternal and infinite self-rejoicing, self-loving, with a joy unfathomable, with a love all comprehensive" (521) through the conscious search after "the peace of God that passeth all understanding," that is, the intuitive beholding of "a pure influence from the glory of God." In short, true reality for Coleridge should have "both its ground and its evidence in the will" (520). The will to be "a partaker of divine nature" in his utmost efforts to become "a second creator of himself & of his own happiness or misery" is the clue to "our marriage with the Redeemer" (Lects 1808-1819, 315).

The Understanding should not "exist for itself" as is the case with the Mariner before the admiration of the watersnakes when he could not set his Reason to work of his own will. The Understanding or the Phenomena should exist as "the instrument of" (F I 521) the Reason as the principle of religion; otherwise, "we think of ourselves as separated beings, and place nature in antitheses to the mind, as object to subject, thing to thought, death to life" (F I 520). Coleridge emphasizes the danger of the "insulation of the understanding" that hedges us in the material world with our secular interests (SM 68). In his opinion, Understanding, which has sometimes been called Discourse ("Essay on Faith," SW II 840) or "formal Logic" (F I 156), should be used as "the means not the end of knowledge" (SM 69). Understanding as well as Reason should help us deepen our self-knowledge, "an insight into the laws and constitution of the human mind, and the grounds of religion and true morality" (AR 14-15).

To experience and contemplate "the peace of God," we need both Reason and Understanding. Strictly speaking, a requisite for "the cultivation of the reason and of the will: or rather of both as united in Faith" (F I 501) is the inclusion of Understanding to Reason so as to utilize the faculty of the former to

... awaken, to cultivate, and to mature the truly human in human nature, in and through itself, or as independently as possible of the notices derived from sense, and of the motives that had reference to the sensations; till the time should arrive when the senses themselves might be allowed to present symbols and attestations of truths, learnt previously from deeper and inner sources. (F I 500-1)

The following extract from Notebook #2546 gives a concrete example of a state when the coexistence of Understanding and Reason, accruing from the "Tri-unity, in Reason, Religion, and the Will" is realized:

In looking at objects of Nature while I am thinking, as at yonder moon dim-glimmering thro' the dewy window-pane, I seem rather to be seeking, as it were asking, a symbolical language for something within me that already and forever exists, than observing any thing new. Even when that latter is the case, yet still I have always an obscure feeling as if that new phænomenon were the dim Awakening of a forgotten or hidden Truth of my inner Nature.

The Platonic awakening of what is truly human and innate so as to elevate "the spirit above the semblance of custom and the senses to a world of spirit" alone "merits the
name of life” (F I 524) for Coleridge.

The awaking of “the religious instinct” or principle which bids us to ‘find tongues in trees; books in the running streams; sermons in stones: and good in everything’ (Shakespeare, As You Like It, II i. 16-7, F I 497) is a Platonic method of self-development, resulting from humanity. Coleridge believes that Platonic self-reflection leads man to an “act of conscious [Godlike] perception” of “those objective truths that exist in and for the intellect alone, the images and representatives of which we construct for ourselves by figure, number, and word” (F I 492). The constitutive Ideas have “a Power” to enable man to enter “ever-progressive, though never-ending, investigation of truth” (F I 493).

Self-reflection on the inborn Ideas within stimulates the instinct of the Reason to perceive, with Understanding and the will to believe, an ideal self image “as one with the whole” (F I 520). But when we “feel within [our]selves a something ineffably greater than [our] own individual nature,” we, at the same time, recognize “[our]selves in nature or nature in [ourselves]” (F I 511), for example, the mysterious impulse to kill the Albatross, due to the imperfect false volition and the Understanding that “exists for itself.” A sense of antithesis of the mind and nature stimulates the instinct of Reason to reduce “Phenomena to Principle,” to subordinate Understanding to itself, by “the injunction of obedience to the will of a super-sensual Being” (F I 501).

Coleridge agrees with Shakespeare to call such Understanding as “in the service of the Reason” “DISCOURSE OF REASON” (Hamlet I i 150, SW II 840). Additionally, he explains that Plato “highly extols under the title of Dialectic” (F I 493) “the discourse of reason” as the proper method for the never-ending cultivation of the will and the ever-progressive transition based on the principle of Reason’s unity from the sensible to the supersensible.

Following Plato’s explanation of the faculty of “Dianoia” in his Dialectics in The Republic (511 B, 532 A-3 D), Coleridge wrote in The Aids to Reflection that the “Dianoia” of 1 John 5:20 should be translated as “a power of discernment by Reason” instead of just “the Understanding” (15). “Dianoia” for Coleridge is “discourse of reason” employed as “the art of Method” of “self-development” in Plato’s works (F I 472-473). For Plato, “Dianoia” represents a virtue of the soul in that its faculty is to “make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness” (The Republic, 510 D). And Plato distinguishes “Dianoia” from “nous” that “makes no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas” (511 BC).

When the New Testament was written, the word “Dianoia” was commonly used. It meant “the activity of thinking” (Theological Dictionary of the New Testament). The activity of thinking implies the involvement of the active will to make us fit to receive God’s influence. In the New Testament, unlike Hellenistic mysticism that insists on man’s natural kinship with God, the “Dianoia” is the faculty inspired by the Son of God “to receive His revelation, to share fellowship with Him;” it is “a direct gift of the Son of God” to “Christians with experience of saving revelation.” In the Synoptic Gospels
(Mark 12:30), the fulfilling of the first commandment claims the whole man, “his whole heart, his whole soul, his whole spiritual life, his whole strength,” and “Dianoia” applies to his whole spiritual life.

The end of the knowledge of Life as “the one universal soul . . . and the informing WORD” is “to become a living soul” (AR 15) by profiting actively by “what we have learnt” (AR 14) passively. “Dianoia” enables us first to be passive to “the Reason < Logos >” “or redemptive Reason” (SW II 842-3), which is Life “substantiated and vital” and “going through all understanding” so as to receive “a pure influence from the glory of the Almighty” (SM 69).

Coleridge tries to get his readers to realize again that God has implanted man with a higher faculty of “dianoia,” which distinguishes man from other animals by enabling us to “imitate” Divine Humanity within. By means of “dianoia” man can become “a living (that is, self-subsisting) soul, a soul having its life in itself” (AR 15). In other words, man has been given a power to become “his proper being, his truest self, the man in the man” (AR 15), which means for Coleridge to become “thy Self all permeable to a holier power” (SM 71) of “redemptive Reason.”

Coleridge wrote in The Statesman’s Manual or The Bible the Best Guide to Political Skill and Foresight that

I can truly affirm of myself, that my studies have been profitable and availing to me only so far, as I have endeavored to use all my other knowledge as a glass enabling me to receive more light in a wider field of vision from the word of God. (70) Coleridge adduced reasons for distress in the post-Napoleonic years and suggested reading the Bible as the best way to repel a tendency to regard pleasure in life as the ultimate objective. The Statesman’s Manual was published in 1816 for Tory leaders with the intention of letting them realize the prominence of the Bible and “the wisdom of God . . . freely given to us” (LS 175). For Coleridge, the knowledge of a God-given faculty, “discourse of reason” or “Dianoia,” “produces the motives” (SM 21) for actions pleasing to God, i.e., our “act of passiveness” for the reception of God’s Love. In consequence, man gets energy of “the platonic Θυμος” to obey the command of the conscience.

Coleridge also wrote that the aims of his “metaphysics” are “to make the reason spread light over our feelings, to make our feelings, with their vital warmth, actualize our reason” (F I 108). In her biography of Coleridge, Rosemary Ashton attaches importance to Coleridge’s remark in 1802: “a great Poet must be, implicitë if not explicitë, a profound Metaphysician” (CL II 810), and cautions Coleridge readers not to

Accept too readily the version of his life story which asserts that Coleridge was diverted from his true metier—poetry—by an unfortunate interest in metaphysics.

(4-5)

Poems and Coleridge’s many prose writings on religion and philosophy were a lifelong proof of his sincere faith in “the Redemptive reason.” In his Confessio Fidei of Nov 1810, 38 year-old Coleridge wrote:

My conscience forbids me to propose to myself the Pains and Pleasures of this Life, as the primary motive or ultimate end of my actions. . . . Its Hopes & Fears there-
fore refer me to a different, and Spiritual state of Being: and I believe in the Life
to come . . . because so to believe is my Duty, and in obedience to the Command of
my Conscience. (CN III #4005)

When the emotions are enlightened by the light of Reason by means of "the discourse of
reason" or "Dianoia," "the platonick Θυμος" strengthens man to "have [his] conscious or
believed Object" in "his proper being, his truest self, the man in the man." Then, one
can transit his "Pains and Pleasure of this Life" to "Emotions, Affections, Attachments &
c [as] the prepared Ladder by which the lower nature is taken up into and made to par-
take of the higher" ("Essay on Faith," SW II 842). Then man becomes all permeable to
God's Grace by prayer, Coleridge believed.

Notes

1. John 1:4 (var.): "In the Word was life; and the life was the light of men." Mary Anne
   Perkins in Coleridge's Philosophy says, "[The] first declaration of the Fourth Gospel is the
   focus of Coleridge's 'logosophic' system. He constantly echoed and explored it from
   the time of his full adoption of a Trinitarian faith (circa 1805). That he found 'Word' (Logos)
   to be a supremely fitting analogy to communicate the reality of the Idea of God is consist-
   ent wit his own character, interests, and talents" (25).

2. See for instance, Wellek, 67; Foreword by Kathleen Coburn in I.A. Richards, xxi; Perkins
   18.

3. Coleridge wrote in 1829: "It is wonderful, how closely Reason and Imagination are con-
nected, and Religion the union of the two. Now the Present is the Epoch of the Under-
standing and the Senses" (F I 203 n).

4. Coleridge read Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason in 1803 and The Metaphysics of
   Morals in 1803 and 1809. And in BL I 153, Coleridge wrote that "Religion within the
   Bounds of Pure Reason took possession of [him] as with a giant's hand."

5. See "On the Prometheus of Aeschlus" (SW II 1258 n).

6. Coleridge in BL I 293 n explained "a priori" in Kant's philosophy: "By knowledge, a priori,
   we do not mean, that we can know anything previously to experience." Knowledge a pri-
   ori is something that must have pre-existed previously to experience to make the experi-
   ence itself possible.

7. See for instance CPR A 69/B 94 or A 80/B 106.

8. See Kant's explanation of categories in CPR pp. 111-115.

9. Socrates thought to himself, "I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows any-
thing fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I,
   as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. I seem, then, in just this little thing
to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know
   either" (Apology 21 D).

10. See Symposium 204 A.

11. Daemon is "genius" or "guardian-angel" (Timaeus 90 An). In The Symposium, Eros of Love
    is described as a daemon. Eros, having Resource (Προσα) for his father and Poverty
    (Ποτος) for his mother, is always poor and far from beautiful but, at the same time, as a
    son of Resource, he yearns after whatever is beautiful and good. Thus, Eros "stands mid-
    way betwixt wisdom and ignorance" (203 E).
12. *Paradise Lost* (V 469-88) quoted by Coleridge in BL (I 295) goes as follows:

O Adam! one Almighty is, from whom
All things proceed, and up to him return
If not depraved from good: created all
Such to perfection, one first nature all
Indued with various forms, various degrees
Of substance, and in things that live, of life;
But more refin'd, more spiritous and pure,
As nearer to him plac'd or nearer tending,
Each in their several active spheres assign'd;
Till body up to spirit work, in bounds
Proportion'd to each kind. So from the root
Springs lighter the green stalk: from thence the leaves
More airy: last, the bright consummate flower
Spirits odorous breathe. Flowers and their fruit,
Man's nourishment, by gradual scale sublim'd
To vital spirits aspire: to animal
To intellectual!—give both life and sense,
Fancy and understanding: whence the soul
REASON receives. And reason is her being,
Discursive or intuitive.

13. "There is nothing in the mind that was not previously in the senses."

14. I will take this matter up at the next opportunity.

15. Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* (1145 b 21-30) also questions Socratic opinion of the weakness of the will in Plato's *Protagoras* (352 BC), saying

Now we may ask what kind of right belief is possessed by the man who behaves incontinently. That he should behave so when he has knowledge, some say is impossible; for it would be strange—so Socrates thought—if when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and drag it about like a slave. For Socrates was entirely opposed to the view in question, holding that there is no such thing as incontinence; no one, he said, acts against what he believes best—people act so only by reason of ignorance. (*Nicomachean Ethics* Book VII 1145 b 21-30)

Risto Saarinen in his *Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought* mentions that Aristotle's *akrasia* (incontinence) or weakness of the will "denotes the moral state of an agent who acts against his or her own better judgment" (iv). Though Saarinen does not refer to the role of the Θυμός in Plato, Aristotle's *akrasia* surely reflects Plato's explanation of the injustice caused by the Θυμός corrupted by evil nature. Unable to be the helper of the reason, the Θυμός does not execute the command of the reason. Under such conditions, man cannot but "act against his or her own better judgment." Consequently, the Θυμός causes self-criticism, the voice of conscience, such as of Odysseus quoted above.

16. Coleridge did not take opium to indulge in pleasures:

... never was I led to this wicked direful practice of taking Opium or Laudanum by any desire or expectation of exciting pleasurable sensations; but purely by terror, by cowardice of pain, first of mental pain, & afterwards as my system became wicked, even of bodily Pain.

(CL III 491)

17. "Pray always" comes from I Thessalonians 5:16-18 by St. Paul:

Rejoice evermore. Pray without ceasing. In everything give thanks: for this is the
will of God in Christ Jesus concerning you.

18. Coleridge wrote in Notebook III #3592:

The very end and final Bliss of the glorified Spirit is represented as a plain aspect, an intuitive Beholding of Truth in its eternal and immutable Source—.

19. The following is Coleridge's definition of a symbol:

... a Symbol is characterized by a translucence ... of the Universal in the General. Above all by the translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative.

(SM 30)

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Abbreviations for the works of S.T.Coleridge, unless otherwise noted.

AR: Aids to Reflection
BL: Biographia Literaria
CL: Letters
CM: Marginalia
CN: Notebooks
CPR: Critique of Pure Reason by Kant
F: The Friend
Lects 1808-1819: Lectures 1808-1819: On Literature
LR: Literary Remains
LS: Lay Sermons
PLects: The Philosophical Lectures
PW: The Complete Poetical Works
SW: Shorter Works and Fragments
TT: Table Talk
UL: Unpublished Letters

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