The Fool-Knave Dichotomy in A Tale of a Tub

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Preface

Those who object against reason are the Fanatics in Poetry, and are never to be sav'd by their good works.

A growing tendency for subjectivity to replace collective tradition since the Renaissance has been pointed out by Ian Watt. In fact, the revolt of the Renaissance and the Reformation against medieval authority led to the rejection of the four levels of meaning in allegorical exegesis—literal, allegorical, moral and anagogical—based upon tradition and authority. In its place, the individual turned inward, finding authority for interpretation within the self. The individual was thrown more and more upon himself and his own resources and he was given a “new associative freedom to allegorize.” Thus, a new type of allegory came into existence. Religious fanatics read Scripture as they pleased, in accordance with their own interpretations. Men chose their own factions. Traditional Restoration criticism continually warned against the private and the singular. Thomas Rymer equated individual fancy in poetry with religious enthusiasm. In spite of Dryden's urge to curb “private reason” in order to maintain “common quiet,” the seventeenth century was conquered by the individualists and the allegorizers like the “single men” in A Tale of a Tub—Peter, Jack, Louis XIV and Descartes, who conceived it in their power to “reduce the notions of all mankind exactly to the same length, and breadth, and height of their own.”

Ronald Paulson calls this kind of allegory in A Tale of a Tub a model for “a juxtaposition of the imaginary and the physical” in the fool tradition, or in other words, “a comedy in which well-founded reality holds madness up to ridicule.” The narrator of the book dissects “the carcass of human nature” like a scientist or rather an anatomist, while on the other hand, he fixes “tropes and allegories to the letter,” and refines
“what is literal into figure and mystery” in the same manner as Jack and the Æolists do. (p. 131) In his mind, indeed, the “dry land” is constantly in clash with his fictional world, which “pops up” through his “imagination... at cuffs with the senses, and common understanding, as well as common sense.” (p. 118) The former refutes and condemns the latter as abortive.

Unlike his modern persona, Swift disapproved enthusiasm and private allegories. It seems that the Modern Writer is made to waver between the literal and the allegorical level of meaning, never going further, and he is kept strictly within the realm of imagination, which contemporary psychologists thought merely to be a “passive, mirror-like faculty,” concerned with our knowledge of the external world. Ronald Paulson has said that the fool tradition deals with the parallelism of the imaginary and the physical: it subsists, at least, on two layers of meaning. With this comment as the clue, this paper intends to examine the problem of the madness and folly of the Hack as well as Swift’s treatment of the persona in the context of the fool tradition.
Chapter I The Hack, The Comedy of Evil and Imagination

Credulity is a more peaceful possession of the mind than curiosity. (pp. 119—120)

In the mind of the Hack the credulous man is one with the fool and the curious man with the knave. He defends, and confesses his closest alliance to, "a fool among knaves." (p. 121) This fool-knave dichotomy has been a battle-field of Swiftian criticism on A Tale of a Tub. Ronald Paulson traces the prototype of the madness of this persona's kind to the fool comedy where a fool collides with reality, the action from which either laughter or illumination can result, and where the real world or the ideal world (that is his madness) will be shown to be the better as in King Lear. Enid Welsford in his history of the fool divides the fool into two types: the fool qua fool regarded as "sub specie etermitatis," a worthless character who neglects his true and ultimately self-interest, and the "sage-fool," the truth-teller whose real insight was thinly disguised as a form of insanity. Although Paulson admits that all that Erasmus' Folly praises turns its ugly side in the Tale, he "presumes" that the Tale-Teller is "all fool." At the literal level he is a fool. He himself cheerfully says that he is a fool recently released from Bedlam. It should be doubted, however, if it is possible to make such a clear-cut distinction between the fool and the knave in his case. One reason for this doubt arises from the fact that the Teller is "one of the least tangible" of Swift's creations—"a conglomerate of incompatible attitudes." The other lies in the very ambiguity implied in the term "fool" itself. Enid Welsford has noted that the words "fool" and "knave" have been constantly coupled together. The Old Testament makes little or no distinction between them: both are sinners.

We find, however, some parity between the Hack and some grotesque
figures in what Bernard Spivack and Douglas Cole call "the comedy of evil," for the "comedy of evil," though less complicated, deals basically with the never-ending puzzle over the nature of evil, and there in the drama the evil characters such as Lucifer and his descendant Vice are literally made not so much to be feared as to be scorned as impotent fools. The Hack's deformed body through his lechery and lack of "common understanding" is the visible sign of his kinship to the ancestor of the fool tradition. In the *Ludus Coventriae* or Hegg cycle Lucifer appears in tattered form and laments:

Now I am a devyl ful derke,
    That was an aungelle bryht.
Now to helle the wey I take,
    In endeles peyn ther to be pyht.
For fere of fyre a fart I crake;
    In helle donjonne myn dene is dyth.

The evil characters are equipped with grotesque figures, with cloven feet, asses' ears, bottle noses and the like deformities, base language, ludicrous gestures, ranting and even pissing. As the action of the drama moves in accordance with their intrigues, they serve at times even as indifferent interpreters of the moral pageant of their own making, taking a prophetic pose, as in the manner of the later sage-fool, but, otherwise, they are wholly given over to persecuting and depraving the good characters—Jesus and his offshoot Virtue until they themselves are caught in the *poena damni* at the end.

As in the All Fools' Day outburst in the monasteries the medieval spectators, conscious of the power of the Devil and Death—the greatest evil on earth, fell into hilarious laughter at their grotesque yet powerless manifestations on the stage, for their perception had been trained in the four levels of meaning in the allegorical exegesis. In this respect
“grotesque” is, indeed, “an extraordinarily precise objective correlative of ludicrous-horror.” In modern times psychoanalysts have given a new light upon the antique pair of concepts *ludicra-seria*, characteristic of medieval arts and letters, the close relationship between the fool and the Devil. Dr. Sidney Terachow finds that the Devil represents man’s forbidden sexual and aggressive impulses. For this reason, he claims, clowns and fools have traditionally been used to act out various attributes of the Devil, genital and hostile.

Whether this parallelism be interpreted on the basis of the theological concept of the privative nature of evil in terms of the world perspective of the “Universal Divine Comedy” or the psychoanalytical concept of the Devil as “the attorney for the other side,” the craft cycles are a dramatization of Bible stories and visible sermons on Christianity appealing not only to the eyes but to the ears. Although a concreteness in which such an abstract notion of evil is invested on the stage may hardly be called a realism of the modern variety, it indicates that these dramas helped people begin to discover interest in worldly life qua worldly life and their unbridled realism, no doubt, strongly caught the spectators’ eyes.

It was Ben Jonson who established such an inseparable connection between the fool, madness and evil, and gave a greater impetus for secularization of the native dramas than any other writer. The Renaissance interest in individual men was furthered by the invasion of the dramatis personae of Greek and Roman classical dramas. People demanded a more realistic delineation of the psychological springs of individual action. By adopting the medieval theory of humours, Ben Jonson took the initiative in inaugurating the tradition of comical satire, in which classicism and the comedy of evil are welded together by the humours. Through
the pseudo-scientific concept of the humours he exposes, as visible evils, unbalanced disposition, mental disorder and apparent impotency, and folly and madness which result from these disturbances caused by the excess of one particular humour in the individual body, and thus he introduced a hierarchy of vicious intelligence ranging from the fool to the knave. As in his *The Devil is an Ass* "the Devil's function becomes that of a satirist," and his evil character is "a great improvement on his prototype of medieval days." His influence upon the seventeenth-century anatomists and character-writers was great, who dissected human nature mainly in terms of the humours.

Jonathan Swift's fool-knave dichotomy owes its existence to the comedy of evil via Jonson's comical satire, breaking away from the sage-fool species such as Lear's Fool. The narrator of *A Tale of a Tub* is no longer young, plagued with diseases and poverty and some domestic misfortunes. His quill is:

> worn to the pith in the service of the state,...from an understanding and a conscience, threadbare and ragged with perpetual turning; from a head broken in an hundred places, by the malignants of the opposite factions, and from the body spent with poxes ill-cured, by trusting the bawds and surgeons, who, (as it afterwards appeared) were professed enemies for me and the government, and revenged their party's quarrel upon my nose and shins, Four-score and eleven pamphlets have I writ under three reigns, and for the service of six and thirty factions. But finding the state has no farther occasion for me and my ink, I retire willingly to draw it out into speculations more becoming a philosopher, having, to my unspeakable comfort, passed a long life, with a conscience void of offence. (p.57)

We get a fairly good picture of the man with a misshapen nose and, moreover, a poxed body. A pox is both a painful punishment for transgression and "an externalization of an internal corruption." His deformed body corresponds to his moral defects in respect of conscience, political
and sexual life. Whether or not the ancient belief that "ugly" and "bad" are synonymous, it is employed here as an objectification of the evil man's sin. In this light, the Grub Street writer stands so close to the figure of the medieval Vice through his hasty yet circumstantial description of himself. The degree of his physical distortion visualizes the degree of his perversion of the normal judgment of actual life as that of the Jonsonian humour-characters' does. He is, indeed, a madman of a special kind—a humourist possessed by "vapours" or by the private speculation, totally alienated. A man with a fixed idea is a madman. "Fool" itself is derived from the French term, Fol, foolish and mad. Samuel Butler combines both aspects of the fool by his adoption of Jonson's theory of humours. He defines the humourist as a mad fool, "who knows no mean; for that is inconsistent with all Humour, which is never found but in some Extreme or other." He even throws the humourist into the category of the religious enthusiast." The Hack as a humourist inevitably falls into religious zeal.

The classical abhorrence of excess deepened its gloomy aspects in the seventeenth century as the social and religious disturbances increased their terror. In the former generation Spenser, Shakespeare, and Sidney had still had enough trust in human reason in finding meaning in the world. But "so quick bright things come to confusion." Platonism had given way to a world of mathematical computation where all are reduced to sense, and where one must fight against another for survival. In such an age Jonson and his disciples analyzed and attacked religious enthusiasts as mad fools (e.g. Jonson's satiric treatment of Zeal-of-the Land Busy in Bartholomew Fair).

The First book against enthusiasm to be published was Meric Casaubon's Treatise concerning Enthusiasme, as it is an Effect of Nature: but is mistaken
by many for either Divine Inspiration, or Diabolical Possession, dated 1655. He declared Plato to be an enthusiast because of his doctrine of inspiration and discovered that “imagination infects the understanding with Enthusiasm.” William Temple defined enthusiasm as delusion. Robert Burton anatomized it under the name of religious melancholy in terms of humours. Thomas Hobbes, to whom “madness is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion,” of which melancholy is one form, defined enthusiasm as “Private Spirit”:

This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit, begins from some lucky finding of an Error generally held by others: and not knowing, or not remembering, by what conduct of reason, they came to so singular a truth, (as they think light on,) they presently admire themselves; as being in the special grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his spirit,

John Locke thought it to be merely a “product of the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain,” founded neither on reason nor on divine revelation. Their attack of enthusiasm came from their distrust of the imagination. But in the seventeenth century “imagination” there is no suggestion of a creative faculty in the “romantic” sense of the phrase, or the Shakespearean juxtaposition of the lunatic, the lover, and the poet. Burton defined imagination as “an inner sense which doth more fully examine the species perceived by common sense, of things, present or absent, and keeps them longer, recalling them to mind again, or making new of his own.” Imagination is thus a means of simple apprehension, the collecting of sense impressions, which are stored up for the scrutiny of reason and making of abstract conception. In its capacity of reflecting sense-images faithfully and in that of combining them, the imagination is thought of as a passive, mirror-like faculty. There is pretty general agreement that this is the function of the imagination

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with regard to our knowledge of the external world alone. Descartes shows the impossibility of understanding by means of the imagination by the changes which a piece of beeswax may undergo. To rationalists the imagination appeared as a highly inadequate instrument for the attainment of the highest kind of knowledge; as a member of the lower, sensitive soul it tempts to a materialistic view of life and also to stir up passions into excesses of enthusiasm. Thus Hobbes the empiricist defined the imagination as "decaying senses," which is apt to obscure the perception in the orderly movement from the senses to the memory to the imagination to the reason. Locke has little to say directly about the imagination. On the basis, or in revolt, of this notions of the imagination Thomas Sprat presented a definite program of new style of "so many things, almost in an equal number of words."

The Grub Street Hack is clearly a man of imagination, as he proudly confesses that he is a "person, whose imaginations are hard-mouthed, and exceedingly disposed to run away with his reason, which I have observed, from long experience, to be a very light rider." (p. 124) Accordingly, he is doomed to see the external world only. In fact, he urges the reader to recognize the importance of the senses—sight and touch—which is concentrated on "the outward of bodies." He condemns the function of reason as "the last degree of perverting nature," which enters into the depth of things to show "the outside has been infinitely preferable to the in." (p. 120)

Thus, the fool-knave dichotomy is expanded to that of imagination and reason, surface and depth, body and soul. As Ricardo Quintana has pointed out, we are "driven back and forth between two modes of experience—creation, imaginative construction, the wild flight of fancy; dissection, analysis." In fact, The Tale of a Tub is of a dual construction.
As the "Apology" states clearly, which Swift wrote in 1709 and inserted in the fifth edition of the Tale six years after its first publication, the work deals with two subjects, abuses in religion and abuses in learning. The whole book is so contrived that each portion of the history of the three brothers—Peter, Martin and Jack—is followed by a digression where the Hack anatomizes and investigates, as a scientist or a philosopher, what is hidden in the previous section. The tale is narrated by the Hack perfectly maintaining the role of the historian. It is a fabulous tale treated only on the literal level. The credulous writer, ironically, is wholly ignorant of the allegorical level of meaning it exhibits: that is, he is, in truth, writing an allegory of the history of Christianity—Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism. The curious writer of the digressions permits himself to embrace absurd Æolism. Although the Hack attacks curiosity, reason, the philosopher, the scientist as the knave, and allies himself to credulity, the fool who remains content with "the sublime and refined point of felicity, called the possession of being well deceived," (p. 121) he contains both within himself. As a humourist he goes to one extreme to the other, and on both extremes he is ultimately destined to see only the surface:

I have found a very strange, new, and important discovery, that the public good of mankind is performed by two ways, instruction and diversion... However, I have attempted carrying the point in all its heights; and accordingly throughout this Divine Treatise, have skilfully kneaded up both together with a layer of utile and a layer of dulce. (p. 90)
Chapter II The Fool-Knave Dichotomy

How near the frontiers of height and depth border upon each other:
(p. 110)

The speaker's "Introduction" begins with a scene of a crowd in which every man "must press, and squeeze, and thrust, and climb with indefatigable pains, till he has exalted himself to a certain degree of altitude above [others]." (p. 48) The Teller's world perspective is caught in this picture of the Hobbesian image of humanity in perpetual war of "every man, against everyman," for Hobbes finds in the nature of man three principal causes of quarrel—"competition for gain, diffidence for safety and glory for reputation." The Hack sublimates or rather simplifies these principles into the passion for pride, for "a superior position of place." Indeed, the modern man conceives it "in his power to reduce the notions of all mankind" to the size of his mind against "the natural state or course of thinking." (p. 116) He boasts, like the spider of The Battle of the Books or of The Advancement of Learning, of "being obliged to no other creature, but of drawing and spinning out all from [himself], . . . [who] by an overweening pride, feeding and engendering on [himself], turns all into excrement and venom, producing nothing at all, but flybane and a cobweb." (p. 170) The world itself has shrunk to the size of the individual mind, local and temporal. The world of A Tale of a Tub is, in fact, a world of private allegory, manipulated in time and space. Either the credulous fool or the curious knave is engaged in creating an imaginary world of his own where he is the sole authority. If allegory is, as Northrop Frye defines, "by this I also (allos) mean that," in allegory, as in no other literary form, the levels of meaning—surface and depth, the literal and the allegorical, at least, or the other three levels—are paralleled of necessity, if a story be regarded as such. It is,
therefore, proper that the existence of the Teller's world depends upon metamorphosis and conflict, going up and down between the levels of meaning.

The "Preface" clearly indicates the quality of the Hack's allegory, perhaps, made as a warning for the credulous reader by Swift at the very beginning of the book. The Modern writer writes of the genesis of his Tale. A Grand Committee has been formed to prevent contemporary wits from "prick[ing] holes in the weak sides of Religion and Government." The Committee has made an important discovery:

Seamen have a custom, when they meet a whale, to fling him out an empty tub by way of amusement, to divert him from laying violent hands upon the ship. This parable was immediately mythologised: the whale was interpreted to be Hobbes's Leviathan, which tosses and plays with all schemes of Religion and Government, whereof a great many are hollow, dry, and empty, and noisy, and wooden, and given to rotation: and this is the Leviathan, whence the terrible wits of our age are said to borrow their weapons. The ship in danger is now to be understood to be its old antitype, the Commonwealth. But to analyse the tub, was a matter of difficulty; when, after long enquiry and debate, the literal meaning was preserved; and it was decreed, that, in order to prevent these Leviathans from tossing and sporting with the Commonwealth (which of itself is too apt to fluctuate) from that game by a Tale of a Tub. (pp. 39—40)

The seamen's actual practice is "mythologised," converted into allegory, contrary to the ordinary process of allegorizing. Thomas Hobbes' monism, materialism, absolutism, the image of man, evil by nature, and the subversion of the faculty psychology were held dangerous schemes to liberal government, which are pictured in the scene of disorder we have seen in "The Introduction." The tub, however, at once suggested to a contemporary the Dissenters' pulpit and the direction of attack the book was going to take. The existence of these two issues is made manifest
in this section. As a result, the tub itself, though still empty, is a dangerous scheme. Besides, the *Leviathans* in the plural in the latter part of the passage implies the impossibility of such a project as the Grand Committee is attempting. After long contemplation, consequently, the Committee agrees to accept its "literal meaning." The Hack's pen really "fluctuates" from the literal or the historical level to the allegorical and from the allegorical back to the literal. He calls this way of allegorizing "physico-logical," ultimately depending upon the literal (p. 52) as in the style of "so many things, almost in an equal number of words."

The Hack's mystical treatment of the tub foretells that the tub imagery will be the crucial point of interpretation throughout the *Tale*. In fact, it soon grows into the figure of the "mountebank, in Leicestershires," who has achieved a "superior position of place" on the barrel (p. 43), physico-logically, by deceiving fools by means of verbal tricks. It is further expanded or distorted into the three ways to reach the position of pride—the pulpit, the ladder, and the stage-itinerant, which, according to the Hack's private interpretation, are adequate symbols for "the writings of the modern saints in England," "faction and poetry," and modern products "designed for the pleasure and delight of mortal man," respectively. He explains the meaning of the pulpit:

By the pulpit are adumbrated the writings of our modern saints in our Britain, as they have spiritualized and refined them from the dross and grossness of sense and human reason. The matter, as we have said, is of rotten wood, and that upon two considerations; because it is the quality of rotten wood to give light in the dark: and secondly, because its cavities are full of worms: which is a type with a pair of handles, having a respect to the two principal qualifications of the preacher, and the two different fates attending upon his works. (p. 52)

The "dross" and "grossness" thrown against "spiritualized" and "refined,"
or the inner qualities of the saint compared to "rotten wood" reduce the sacred completely to the ground of matter, "the dry land" of their reality. The modern fanatic preacher, noted for his inner light and his head full of maggots, produces works which are only worthless, doomed to be cast either into the fire or into oblivion, worm-eaten. This metaphorical meaning is survived by its literal level of meaning. Through his "converting imagination" (p.131) the persona constantly avers that his figures are "great mystery, being a type, a sign, an emblem, a shadow, a symbol, bearing analogy" (p.52) to almost anything, the believing importance of the hidden meaning," darkly and deeply couched under the beautiful externals for the gratification of superficial readers." (p.55) The vehicle becomes separate from the tenor and concrete enough to live its own life. If the metaphysical wit is defined as "a kind of discordia concors," the Teller's wit is destined, like a footless "bird of paradise," unable to come to the earth until it falls dead upon the wing. (p.111)

The discord between surface and depth produces, under cover of clothes philosophy or tailor-worship, the most devastating satire on the abuses both in religion and in learning. The physico-logical treatment of the tub has developed into the clothes philosophy at the literal level, and, at the same time at the deeper levels, into the problem of the body-soul dichotomy in relation to the concept of man as the vessel of God's mercy and wrath. Swift may have derived the figure of the tailor as that of a deity from the doctrine of Calvinism where there is the dominant image of God sitting at the loom of time weaving the web of individual lives. The narrator presents the clothes philosophy and attempts to prove that man is made up of two suits of clothes and that "the soul was the outward, and the body the inward clothing," through this casuistry: the clothes are the essential man because "in them we live, and move, and
have our being. As likewise by philosophy because they are all in all, and all in every part.” (p.62) Charles Allen Beaumont exposes the fundamental error on the side of the speaker:

In addition to his dependence upon Anaxagoras, the Hack first misquotes Paul, who had said, “For in him [God] we live, and move, and have our being,” (Acts 17:28) and “when all things shall be subdued unto him [God], then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all.” (I Cor. 15:28) The misquoting of Paul seems deliberate enough so that man can be said to move about in his clothes; his second quotation from Paul is wrenched out of context, although the phrase is frequent in Roman Catholic doctrine.  

Beaumont concludes that the metamorphosis of the tailor into a deity and the confusion of body and soul, of matter and mind, are the perversion of Christian truth—sins.  

The whole passage indicates that the Hack is ignorant that at the moral and analogical levels the world of the tailor-worship is a world of sin and depravity and that religion is reduced to the level of the physical while the clothes are raised to the level of religion. The seria-ludicra situation is, indeed, an impetus for the three brothers to distort their father’s will while for Swift it is the occasion to attack scholastic interpretation of Scripture by applying Aristotle’s dialectics, new science or system-making, toward which (and especially to the abuses of which) Swift had deep antipathy, each relying upon his own subjectivity.

Once the “original coats” have started to suffer deformations and the doctrine of the “vessels” has been dragged to the ground of matter, in the “transitory state of all sublunar things” (p.54) “I” and “here” and “now” are the sacred fundamentals of living for the modern men. Descartes’ “Cogito, ergo, sum,” at a stroke, alienated each individual from the other, and mind from matter, not only in space but in time. Modern
self-centeredness is shown by the Hack's frequent use of "I" and by his
eagerness to localize himself. He belongs to the group of writers of
Grub Street (the home of mean writers), neglected by his "more successful
Brethren the moderns" of Gresham College (the meeting place of the
Royal Society) and Will's Coffee-house (the resort of poets and critics),
he is "a most devoted servant of all modern forms," (p. 42) writing "this
panegyric" (p. 45) on the modern world. In his pride on being "the
Freshest modern" (p. 94) he pinpoints time and space "today,... or in this
place, or at eight o'clock, or... spoke by Mr. What'd'y'call'm, or in a
summer's morning." (p. 41) He is devoted to date his work. He swears
that "what I... say is literally true this minute I am writing." (p. 36) He
speaks not only in the first person singular but usually in the present
tense. If he mentions the past it is only yesterday that he ordered the
carcass of a beau to be stripped in his presence. He understands time
"by tracing [it] backward." (p. 103) He testifies, as a consequence, that
a true modern cannot of necessity be a little subject to shortness of
memory. (p. 96) Their forgetfulness of all other things most effectively
pushes men to concentrate upon themselves, here and now.

The moderns in a world of clothes philosophy have initiated the "grave
dispute, whether there have been ever any ancients or no." (p. 90) While
the Hack the investigator gives the image of the true critic, as a man
of new learning, coupled with the picture of an ass with horns or that
of a serpent that wants teeth, but corrupts everything with its vomit
(pp. 75—76), ready to pay lip service to the antiquity of the true critic,
he is constrained, like William Wotton or Time "to pretend it a demon-
stration that there never was any, because they are not then to be
found." (p. 34) Brian Vickers says that Swift indirectly aims his attack
at Francis Bacon, held as a monument of human learning and new
science. Bacon used to discredit the worship of the past, suggesting that the present age is antiquity: "These times are the ancient times, when the world is ancient, and not those which we account ordine retrogrado, by a computation backward from ourselves." Besides, Bacon had written: "I have taken all knowledge to be my Province." The modern Writer attacks Homer on the basis of Baconian standards. The chief minutiae of his defects are revealed to be his lack of knowledge of spleen and tea. The Hack agrees, in this respect, with William Wotton, Temple's opponent in the ancients-and-moderns controversy. Though Swift was "supremely indifferent" to the philosophical questions involved, by reducing the Modern Writer's attack to meaningless chaos only to show his own lack of knowledge, Swift satirizes the modern self-complacency of Bacon's kind—"pride which convinces [a man] that he can live by the light of his unaided reason—every man his own carver." (p. 93)

Furthermore, the Modern's contention is derived from his sole reliance upon the imagination in viewing matter and mind:

The debate merely lies between things past, and things conceived, and so the question is only this: whether things that have place in the imagination, may not as properly be said to exist, as those that are seated in the memory; which may be justly held unto affirmative, and very much to be the advantage of the former, since this is acknowledged to be the womb of things, and the other allowed to be no more than the grave. (p. 119)

As a consequence in his fictional world the past and the present co-exist in confusion. Homer is the inventor of the compass, gunpowder, the circulation of the blood. (p. 93) Pausanias and Ctesias are a modern geologist and a modern physician respectively. Cicero wrote to a friend in England that he should beware of being cheated by hackney-coachmen." (p. 117) The clothes philosophy is transformed into a cult of court-
fashions. The Hack combines any ideas by force which pop up in his mind the very moment he is writing. It is proper that he confesses himself to be a former Bedlamite, holding "a peculiar honour for presenting a system of Æolism" and madness.

In "A Digression Concerning the Original, the Use, and Improvement of Madness, in a Commonwealth," the Tale-Teller defends and praises madness. Men must make a choice between madness and curious reason. He insists that madness is superior to sanity, to reason, and to science. Its superiority is that of a fool among knaves, for the greatest actions in the world are directly owing to madness. Madness, indeed, is responsible for the "establishment of new empires by conquest, the advance and progress of new schemes in philosophy, and the converting, as well as the propagating, of new religions." (p. 113) These learned proofs make the traditional appeals to the noble ancestry of madness. In spite of his worship of all modern forms, he adopts the theory of "vapours" as the cause of madness, the four humours, originating in antiquity (Hippocrates, Empedocles), which was still common in Swift's day; Burton, Hobbes, Locke were not indifferent to it.

The Modern anatomist confidently speaks to the reader:

The reader will, I am sure, agree with me in the conclusion; that if the moderns mean by madness, only a disturbance or transposition of the brain, by force of certain vapours issuing up from the lower faculties; then has this madness been the parent of all those mighty revolutions, that have happened in empire, in philosophy, and in religion. (p. 118)

By the use of "if" the origin of madness he has so far systematized is reduced to a mere assumption, a shadow, and the examples have proved the theory. All can be explained by the concrete and actual existence of "vapours": madness and "vapours" are synonymous. He has thrown
the whole responsibility of the theory upon the credulous reader. He is the mountebank of his "Preface." As such he does not care for final causes: "It is of no import, where the fire was kindled, if the vapour has once got into the brain." (p. 113) The Modern is concerned only with material causes and vapours are a kind of matter. Beyond the physical his imagination cannot go. When the time comes for him to make the solution to the problem of why and how, he employs the most desperate of all logical methodes: "Hic multa desiderantur." (p. 118) This literally reveals the inadequacy of the Writer's materialistic philosophy and physico-logic.

Furthermore, in his encomium on delusion of the senses by vapours or madness, he blames reason's "unmasking," and he raises a question what would happen if mankind considered how pleasureless the world would be without delusion, in the same manner as Erasmus' Folly, and then he adds, "as I have a certain reason to suspect it hardly will." (p. 119) His assertion that men always prefer delusion is puffed away at once. Another passage completely nullifies his whole argument:

The brain, in its natural position and state of serenity, disposeth its owner to pass his life in the common forms, without any thoughts of subduing multitudes to his own power, his reasons, or his visions; and the more he shapes his understanding by the pattern of human learning, the less he is inclined to form parties, after his particular notions, because that instructs him in his private infirmities, as well as in the stubborn ignorance of the people. (p. 118)

A momentary flash of "common forms" arises merely by way of his own false logic. The speaker suddenly recommends the establishment of a committee to inspect Bedlam and the release of the madmen for the universal benefit of the Commonwealth (p. 122), as there are complete systems of all wits and skills for courtiers, soldiers, philosophers,
statesmen and even tailors, though "with wrong application." (p. 123)
This project is contradictory to his own assertion in the "Preface" that
the Tale was written to save the Commonwealth from contemporary wits.
Thus the Modern Writer mimetically describes what state of mind he is
in. That state of mind is to be called madness.

"A Digression concerning Madness" gives examples of madness in the
realms of politics and philosophy. The account of Æolism supplies those
in religion—enthusiasm. Enthusiasm comes from the Latin term enthu-
siasmos, derived from the Greek en (in) + theos (god). Because of the most
illustrious explication of this concept in Phaedrus Plato was attacked as
an enthusiast by Rymer, though the Dissenters' claim that they were
God-inspired was of a different order as we have seen in contemporary
authors' statements. "To inspire" means "to breathe in." Hence the
Hack plays upon the root meaning of the word "spirit" arising from
"spiritus," breath—"spiritus, animus, afflatus, or anima." (p. 106) Since Æo-
lism is derived from the Greek God of Wind Æolus, the Æolists maintain
the original cause of all things to be wind. G. R. S. Mead explains the
relationship between wind, breath and soul. He says that for some
centuries in the Western Tradition "the soul was believed to be air, and
air breath, and breath spirit, and spirit and soul one—just simply air."
But for many of these writers spirit means "subtle body, an embodiment
of a finer order of matter than that known to physical sense." Spirit
came to be distinguished from soul; soul was thought of as "utterly in-
corporeal"; spirit, not. It was easy to say, following Aristotle's De Anima,
that the soul is the form of the body, since form cannot exist without
its accordant material and yet form is not itself material. The soul is
essentially a spirit, a separate and independent substance; so it did not
die with the body. Swift would not take this seriously.
The real author lets the Æolists identify wind with the animating breath, the spirit, the *anima mundi*. He also lets them go content with the literal or physico-logical level of meaning of the term. There is no difference in their confused minds (like the Modern’s) between eloquence, belching, religious enthusiasm, vapours, blowing wind, inspiration: they are all wind. The Æolists are, in truth, possessed with humours or vapours. They are mad fools, fed on a world of private allegory. “Fool” is from Latin, *follis*, bag, or bellows. All windy notions are brought together to serve madness. The persona adds to these even medical terms such as the swelling “bag,” the “organism,” and the *fistula in ano*.

The Æolists blow themselves up with their own ideas and words. They belch (preach), because their gift “ought not to be covetously hoarded up, stifled, or hid under a bushel, but freely communicated to mankind.” (p.107) At the literal level the Hack defends the sect by referring to the parable of the talents, but at the deeper level he unwittingly condemns that their very talent of belching with “their mouths gaping wide against a storm” ought to be hidden under a bushel. In their self-sufficiency the “vessels”—their bodies—are blown up “to the shape and size of a tun” by a pair of bellows. Their doctrine is that:

First, it is generally affirmed, or confessed that learning puffeth men up: and secondly, they proved it by the following syllogism: words are but wind; and learning is nothing but words; ergo, learning is nothing but wind. (p.108)

The tub imagery which has undergone a variety of metamorphosis is to suffer the final transformation into air, nothing. Charles Allen Beaumont perceives that the Hack’s use of the “vessels” is a misquotation from Paul’s letter to the Romans, where Paul says that although God’s mercy is offered to all, he regards those who refuse his mercy as the
“vessels of wrath fitted to destruction.”  

We are made to see that the extreme preachers are the “vessels of wrath.” Again, by quoting Paul, who said, “Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth” (I Cor. 8:1), the Hack calls the Æolists proud, literally taking “puffeth up.” Spiritual pride, and its species, the pride of self-sufficiency, is the sin which Swift charges such enthusiastic preachers with, whether or not he had got the hint for his treatment of the Æolists from Bacon’s History of Winds. 

Now learning and religion in excessive form are reduced to air, nothing. However, Swift’s reductio ad absurdum does not stop there. The Modern Writer mentions that female officers are better suited for these mysteries because:

[their] organs were understood to be better disposed for the admission of those oracular gusts, as entering and passing up through a receptacle of greater capacity, and causing also a pruriency by the way, such as, with due management, hath been refined from carnal into a spiritual ecstasy. (p. 110)

In the juxtaposition of carnal with spiritual ecstasy in addition to the pun on the “receptacle of greater capacity” (ecstasy is the mental state caused by enthusiasm), Swift exposes that religious enthusiasm is nothing but concupiscence. The last of the three “great actions” caused by madness is thus epitomized in the grotesque image of the Æolists in the likeness of the medieval Evil characters. All are dragged to carnal appetites, beastly—the inversion of the Chain of Being, or “sin against the Eternal Cause.”

In the chaotic mind of the Hack Æolism is visualized and localized in Jack like “a drunken beau,... a fresh tenant of Newgate,... a bawd in her old velvet petticoat, resigned into the secular hands of the mobile,” (p. 100) although, as usual, the Historian avoids responsibility by saying that he does not care whether “this system... was wholly compiled
by Jack; or...rather copied from the original at Delphos, with certain additions and emendations.” (p.112)

Jack believes that “the wise man was his own lantern.” (p.133) His head appears “like the skull of an ass” in the dark night. He distrusts his eyes, solely relying upon his inner light. As a consequence he “would shut his eyes as he walked,” he [invariably would] “bounce his head against a post, or fall into a kennel, (as he seldom missed either to do one or both).” (p.133) He explains his bloody nose in terms of predestination. He has a way of working the copy of his father's will into any shape he pleases; it serves him for a night-cap, an umbrella, remedy for a sore toe, a stomachache. His original coat is already torn from top to bottom by his own hand through his hatred toward Peter rather than through his zeal for obedience to his father's will. Now he has introduced a new deity, “by some called Babel, by others Chaos”. (p.134) By the image of an ass coupled with his head, Jack is a fool; by his denial of his own senses he is a man totally alienated not only from other men but from the external world, confined within his own world of allegory. With his distortion of his father's will for his own use he is a sinner. He is, in concrete reality, a “heathen philosopher.” (p.137)

His enthusiasm arises more from spite and hatred toward Peter than from his obedience to his father's will, yet he bears a huge resemblance to Peter. Peter is a madman, too. As early as Section III the Historian reported that the scholastic Peter “was grown distracted... with pride, projects and knavery... Alas: he had kept his brain so long and so violently upon the rack, that at last it shook itself, and began to turn round for a little ease.” (p.84) Peter and Jack are like “two pair of compasses, equally extended, and the fixed foot of each remaining in the same centre.” (p.137) “As it is the nature of rags to bear a kind of mock
resemblance to finery, there being a sort of fluttering appearance in both, which is not to be distinguished at a distance, in the dark, or by short-sighted eyes,” (p. 137) Jack the fool and Peter the knave are two different vessels but they are madmen of the same kind, “vessels of wrath.”
Conclusion

There generally runs an irony through the thread of the whole book, which the men of taste will observe and distinguish. (p. 16)

The Teller insists upon his modernity, his identity, his particular spot of existence, yet deprived of memory, the past and even his name, he is not a modern at all. He is a being floating like an empty tub in timeless space. His existence is in doubt. He presents himself through a variety of attitudes. He is at times the historian, the next moment the Grub Street writer, yet at times the Dissenting enthusiast, at other times, the scholastic deducer of learned systems, or modern virtuoso objectively dissecting human nature. His pride in his discoveries is constantly taken down, at last, to air, nothing, but his pride is the sole proof of his existence and consistency. He proudly confesses, in fact, that a profound writer (he is certainly one) is as “wondrous dark” as the deepest well, empty and dry. He is skilled in the art of sinking. Indeed, he has the ability to “write nothing.” (p. 142) He praises destructive criticism, digressions, madness; he finds Restoration stages and the Dissecting Pulpits identical with the gallows, and Catholic Peter and Dissenting Jack indistinguishable. He believes that sciences are found, like Hercules’s oxen, “by tracing them backward.” (p. 130) He is the “last writer” and the “freshest modern” simultaneously. Thus, the latest moment and the surface of physical objects are firmly allied. Clothes can be regarded as the soul, blasphemously distorting the meaning of “vessels.” Madness itself is defined as delight in the surface, content with “the films and images that fly off upon his senses from the supercificies of things.” (p. 120)

“When [a man] gives the spur and bridle to his thought, it [doth] never stop, but naturally sallies out into both extremes, of high and low, of good and evil,” and thus he turns a humourist, possessed with the vapour
called the pride of self-sufficiency, to such a man, Swift exclaims, "How near the frontier of height and depth border upon each other!" (p. 110)

Even if the *Tale* starts by giving the fool the role of the historian, flight of imagination, and the knave that of the philosopher in charge of the digressions and reason, eventually both merge into the figure of the "mountebank, in Leicester-fields," who has attained his place of pride by the barrel—the knave who deceives fools by means of words and empty projets yet who is wholly ignorant of the ridiculous nature of what he is saying. He is a humourist who has suffered some loss of elasticity in the body and mind through "humour," that is, what Henri Bergson calls "something mechanical encrusted on the living" as the source of the comic. This image exactly corresponds to the grotesque figure of Vice exulting in the fool-knave dichotomy, yet impotent and held up for ridicule. The Teller himself justly claims, after denying the theory of two types of madness owing either to deficiency or redundancy, that both are from redundancy. (p. 121) Bacon has the perception into the dual nature of vice:

This vice [or disease of learning] therefore brancheth itself into two sorts; delight in deceiving, and aptness to be deceived; imposture and credulity; which, although they appear to be of a diverse nature, the one seeming to proceed of cunning, and the other of simplicity, yet certainly they do for the most part concur: for... an inquisitive man is a prattler, so upon the like reason a credulous man is a deceiver.

Credulity and curiosity, imagination and reason, both are joined together only to be dragged down *ad absurdum*. In the image of the *Æolists* blowing themselves up by a pair of bellows to the final disemboguement (p. 108) is epitomized the windy and yet self-destructive nature of the fool-knave dichotomy. Both types are abnormal deviations from the "common forms," each over-simplifying the notions of all mankind to the size of
his own single mind. Both are entirely alienated from everything outside themselves, from even their own true selves, and from collective tradition. They are void of any sense of responsibility to society or to other fellow creatures, living within the world of their private allegories and fixing their eyes only on "I," now and here. What they fundamentally miss is Pope's classical dictum—"the proper study of Mankind is Man." They are, in fact, dehumanized, undergoing self-disintegration! The world of *A Tale of a Tub* is a world of fallen men, "the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction," held up for ridicule.

Swift the real author, under cover of the comedy of evil, attacks Cartesian egoism, Hobbesian monism, the pleasure-seeking Epicurism, Royal Society scientists or rational Deistic theologians. He attacks:

the Catholics for adding to the primitive structure of Christian belief such things as Purgatory, the cult of oral tradition, the inclusion of the Apocrypha, images of saints, Papal Infallibility, Indulgences, clerical celibacy, and Transubstantiation. He attacks the Dissenters for imposing absurd extremes of interpretation on a Bible which is, to start with, 'plain' and 'easy'; for quoting sacred texts upon all occasions; and for inventing Predestination.

In this spirit the past is to be preferred to the present. Memory is the acknowledgement we give to the past. "To give invention the master, and to give method and reason the office of its lackeys" (p. 143) is the sin of pride, madness and impiety. The best way to restore the "common forms" while remaining an artist is to deflate pretensions, the disparity between surface and reality. The tool Swift uses for this is irony. He is confident of his manipulation of irony:

    Arbuthnot is no more my friend,
    Who dares to irony pretend;
    Which I was born to introduce,
    Refin'd it first, and shew'd its use."
If irony is derived from *eironeia* "mocking pretense and deception," inseparable from Socratic dialectic, it depends upon layers of meaning. Allegory is where his irony works best, measuring the distance between the layers of meaning—the fool and the knave, surface and depth, allowing the reader constantly to get a double viewpoint of one situation. It is the very weapon with which he can neutralize the venom of his attack and yet, by plunging it into the unconscious, he can vex the reader into sanity, who is forced to live in a world where:

all virtues that have been ever in mankind, are to be counted upon a few fingers; but his follies and vices are innumerable, and time adds hourly to the heap. (p. 45)

From the amused complacency of the spectators we are awakened into the reality that we are no better than fools and knaves.

By fixing all his characters to the external world of things in accordance with the contemporary theory of imagination, at the physico-logical level, and by adopting the dramaturgy of the comedy of evil tradition, Swift has "the dry land" or reality of their true selves, through concrete images of things, mock at the men possessed by pride. If pride is viewed as madness, caused by humours inherent in the human body, none of us is free from this sin. We are mad, "the vessels of wrath." *A Tale of a Tub* is, in truth, a panorama of evils and sins, a study of the limitations of man. Reality is too complex; evil is more serious than its simplified presentation, fabricated by the single mind, living in the dark.

Since humours are a kind of matter claiming their existence within our bodies, they can be under our control, even if there is no way for us to escape from their danger. Swift's practical solution to such madness, pride, impiety and confusion, perhaps, lies in the figure of half-blind humanity, in the reformed Martin. He entreats his brother Jack no more to damage his coat:
for he never would get such another; desired him to consider, that it was not their business to form their actions by any reflection upon Peter, but by observing the rules prescribed in their father's will. (p. 100)

The images of the “original coat,” “common forms,” and “the brain in its natural position” are scattered throughout the Tale: “like seeds, which, however, scattered at random, when they light upon a fruitful ground, [they] will multiply far beynod either the hopes or imagination of the sower.” (p. 128)

In our contemporary world, almost fallen apart into smallest atoms, with each being his sole authority, Swift's exhortation upon “the obedience to the father's will is of importance to any one who is allowed, open-eyed, to delve into the deeper level of meaning hidden underneath the superficials of things, even though he is physically destined to see darkly. This may be the only way for him to reform himself from the “vessel of wrath” into the “vessels of mercy.”
Notes


12. F. R. Leavis, Irvin Ehrenpreis, Martin Price, Ricardo Quintana, to name a few, have given an interpretation in one way or another.

13. Paulson, pp. 82-83.

15. Paulson, p. 82.


17. Welsford, p. 236.


34. Williams, p. 23.
40. *A Midsummer-Night’s Dream* V. i. 4-22.
42. Bond., p. 428.
43. René Descartes, *Meditationes* (1641), quoted from Bond, p. 249.
60. Vickers, p. 90.


69. Bacon, VI, 125.


71. Donoghue, p. 42.


75. Kathleen Williams, Jonathan Swift and the Age of Compromise, p. 134.
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