

S. T. Coleridge and Platonic Revelation from Within(2):
Coleridge and Kant's Moral Feeling Compared

Setsuko Wake

要 約

S. T. コールリッジと内奥からのプラトンの啓示 (2) ——カントの道徳的感情との比較——

和気 節子

本稿では Part 1 に引き続き、コールリッジが道徳の実践やキリスト教信仰における感情の役割をどのように位置付けているのかを検討する。彼の道徳的感情の説明にみられるプラトニズムをカントの道徳的感情に関する分析と比較させながら、コールリッジのカント理解の特徴を探ってみる。

コールリッジにとって道徳的感情とは、理性あるいは理性の働きをとらえる「霊的感觉」としての良心から湧き出る感情を意味する。それは、「神の平安」(ピリピ、4.7)を観想させる感情であったり、自らの行いへの悔恨の情であったりする。コールリッジによると、感覚の束縛から解放され、それ故に責任ある自由意志が積極的に生み出す道徳的感情は、外界からの影響に左右されやすい感覚的感情以上に、愛の実践を通して、神の導きに応答していく。

コールリッジは *Aids to Reflection* において、「聖書そしてプラトンの区別に従い」、我々には、思慮分別面、道徳面、そしてキリスト教精神面という3段階の精神的発展が必要であると主張している。道徳的感情は、この漸進的成長に伴い、これを補助しながら我々をプラトンのアイデアの世界、つまり、「天上からの恩恵によってのみ近づき得る」世界へと導き、被造物として可能な限り、「神に似た」霊的な存在へと浄化させる。

カントも『単なる理性の限界内における宗教』や『道徳形而上学』のなかで、コールリッジ同様、超自然的な助けに対する感受性を高めるものとして、「人間本性のうちにある善への根源的素質」をあらゆる道徳的感情の意義を認めている。カントによると、「我々に道徳的義務の実践を命じる良心への尊敬の念」としての道徳的感情は、感覚対理性の関係の克服、理性による感覚的感情の教化/修正を意味する。それは、コールリッジおよびプラトンが祈り求めた全人的な道徳、信仰の実践、「神の意志」との和解の可能性を示している。

『単なる理性の限界内における宗教』を賞賛し、『道徳形而上学』も読破していたコールリッジは、カントのこれら後期の著作にみられるプラトンの要素、即ち、理性の神概念(アイデア)を道徳の実践に際し、我々を「神に似た」絶対意志の獲得へと導く原動力とみなしている点に賛同したといえる。コールリッジは自己認識が真に清められた歓びの源となるための条件、“*Dejection: An Ode*”においては対峙する理想的な精神状態を説明する哲学として、プラトンやカントを理解しようとした。

Introduction

A lifelong S.T. Coleridge concern was the function of feelings¹, as indicated by the exhortation of Humphrey Davy, a chemist and President of the Royal Society, “to be the historian of the Philosophy of feeling-Do not in anyway dissipate your noble nature” (CL II 1103). The first scholar to point out the significance for Coleridge of the feeling of moral responsibility as a primary factor to refute Locke’s empiricism was James Marsh, President of the University of Vermont, who introduced Coleridge’s *Aids to Reflection* (1825) to America in 1829. In his preliminary essay to *Aids*, Marsh rightly wrote that Coleridge had considered moral feelings indicated the “essential distinction between that which is *natural*, and that which is *spiritual*.” Moral feeling implies our emancipation from slavery to the outward senses to reflection on spiritual freedom. If the same universal law of nature, of cause and effect, is applied to the acts of free-will, then there will be no “rational grounds for the feeling of *moral obligation*” (AR 509). In Coleridge’s opinion, feeling bitter remorse for wrongdoings testifies to a free will forming the spiritual through its “subordination to the reason, as a ray from that true light which is both reason and will, universal reason, and will absolute” (AR 42).

Up to the present, Marsh’s remark that attention to the role of feeling characterises Coleridge’s philosophical and religious writings as well as his poems has been generally accepted². But few studies have compared Coleridge’s idea on the nature of moral feelings guided by “reason, as a ray from that true light which is both reason and will” and that of Plato’s and Kant’s. A comparison suggests the interpretation that, in Coleridge’s opinion, Plato discussed more than Kant how the mind could be for those who, by “receiving the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father” (Romans 8.15-6, SM 90), “came closest to the goal/Whereto by Heaven’s grace man may attain” (Petrarch, “Del Triunfo della Fama, Cap. III. 1.5,6 quoted by Coleridge in AR 42n; CM II 868). Coleridge attempted to show referring to Plato’s metaphysics and Kant’s logic, the possibility of ultimate moral happiness man can feel through steadfast faith in Christ who declared that “No man cometh to me, unless the Father leadeth him” (John 6.44, AR 406). By doing so, he tried to make his readers of *Aids* treasure sincere moral feelings of “the want of Christianity” and rouse them “to the self-knowledge of his *need*” of religion (405-6).

According to Coleridge, to feel intensely “Heaven’s grace,” that is, the Logos within³ leading him, is the ultimate happiness man can create by and for himself. By nature, man is privileged to feel real happiness facing the objects that manifest Life. With morality and religion, man is to awaken his mind to “the sincere love of the True as truth; of the Good, as good: and of God as both in one” (AR 40), and be delighted at his knowledge of God. It is because to apprehend the Logos means to secure true happiness in self-contemplation:

The Logos-or coeternal idea-feeling himself the infinitely representative of God & infinitely happy in contemplation of himself as the absolutely infinite & perfect likeness of God was impelled by *infinite Love* to multiply finite images of Deity each happy in contemplating itself & the images around it-as being representative of Deity-Snatch a gaze at the Sun, then turn & contemplate them in the fountain-Prayer & meditation-Angels in the beatific Vision, then turn to created things—

("Reflection on God's Ideas," SW I 156)

The coeternal idea of Logos is the "most glorious birth of the God-like within us" since for Coleridge, to know the Logos is to possess the feeling of the Logos (SM 48, 50). It is the infinite happiness of self-reflection to know himself in his highest cause, himself being created from the infinite love of the Logos to add to finite images each happy in contemplating himself and things around him. Knowledge on the infinite love of Logos promises us the happiest way to attain knowledge in "Prayer & meditation" because ideas of Logos, of God are both regulative and constitutive.

We can advance the knowledge of the ideas of Logos in happy experience because "an Idea is not simply knowledge or perception as distinguished from the thing perceived: it is a realizing knowledge, a knowledge causative of its own reality; in it is Life, & the life is the light of men" ("On Divine Ideas" fo. 3 quoted by Perkins 178). The infinite love of Logos for the created contains the vital power of utterly transforming the quality of our daily behaviors. Engrafted into the power of Life by reason and religion, man becomes capable of saying prayers and meditating freely at will on

. . . Joy that ne'er was given,
Save to the pure, and in their purest hour,
Life, and Life's effluence, cloud at once and shower,
Joy, Lady! is the spirit and the power,
Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower
A new Earth and new Heaven,
Undreamt of by the sensual and the proud—
Joy is the sweet voice, Joy the luminous cloud—

We in ourselves rejoice!

("Dejection: An Ode," 64-72; PW I 365-66)

In "Dejection: An Ode" (1802) Coleridge lamented that he could not feel "his Shaping spirit of Imagination" (86) since he could not "in [himself] rejoice" (72), thinking himself being far from the reality of "pure of heart" (59) producing hope.

What Coleridge craved was the religious hope depicted, for instance, in "The Eolian Hope," that came from his faith in Christ always strengthening him in proportion to his conceptions and feelings that he needs His love for him:

. . . never guiltless may I speak of him,
The Incomprehensible! save when with awe
I praise him, and with Faith that inly *feels*;
Who with his saving mercies healéd me,
A sinful and most miserable man . . .

(58-62; PW I 102)

Without religious hope, "Faith that inly *feels*," Coleridge's imagination wanes. It is because the role of imagination for Coleridge's spiritual religion is to "attach all [the] conceptions and feelings, and of applying all the words and phrases expressing reality, to the objects of the Senses: more accurately speaking, to the images and sensations by which their presence is made known to us;" reality for him is to "feel the want of Christianity" from "the self-knowledge of his *need* of it" with the intention of "awaken[ing] the mind to the true Criteria of Reality, viz. Permanence, Power, Will manifested in Act, and Truth operating as Life" (AR 406).

Effective religion that the poet could not embrace in “Dejection: An Ode” presupposes knowledge of God attained by a pure heart “by a vital and spiritual act in which to know and to possess are one and indivisible” (SM 48). It can be said that Coleridge attempted to extract much meaning of the spiritual “given/. . . to the pure, and in their purest hour” (“Dejection: An Ode,” 54-55) from what Plato and Kant said. I would like to observe further how Coleridge explained the essentials of the spiritual, incomprehensible yet graspable by feelings, in terms of Platonic and Kantian ideas about man’s feelings. Since writing “Dejection: An Ode” at the age of thirty, at the latest, his aim of “abstruse research” in philosophy as “the habit of [his] soul” had been to construct a theory of man’s ultimate happiness that could bring about a better state in which

. . . hope grew round me, like the twining vine,
 And fruits, and foliage, not my own, seemed mine. (80–81; PW I 366)

We can sympathize with all creation in our groans and hopes to be redeemed to stand aloof from the present state (SM 90).

I : Coleridge on the Platonic growth of the spirit

Coleridge emphasizes that “the scriptural division coincides with the Platonic which, commencing with the prudential . . . ascends to the moral . . . and seeks its summit in the imitation the Divine nature” (*Theaetetus* 176 B, AR 40–41). He therefore divides *Aids* into three levels: concerning prudential aphorisms, moral and religious aphorisms, and aphorisms on spiritual religion. As Coleridge mentions in *The Statesman’s Manual*, prudence and morality become worthwhile only if they help experience the invisible “as a glass enabling [us] to receive more light in a wider field of vision from the word of God” (70). Without assimilation of prudence and morality to spiritual religion, we cannot feel the joy of creating the ultimate happiness of beholding Light from heaven within and without.

Coleridge positively initiated his readers into the mysteries of being impressed upon the image of his Maker, by disciplining or creating their moral feelings, their own happiness or misery. “Man alone was privileged to clothe himself and to do all things so as to make him as it were a secondary creator of himself” (Lects 1808–1819 I 315). This sort of Platonic and, in a sense, Kantian (as I will show later) belief in our ability to repress our self-interest through prudence, morality, and spiritual religion, had attracted the Coleridge of *Aids to Reflection*. Referring to their theories of mind, Coleridge emphasized that the moral feeling, namely, “the inward feeling, . . . the experience . . . that the Redemption and the Graces propounded to us in Christ are what [man] needs” arouse mysteriously:

. . . hope that can never die,
 Effort, and expectation, and desire,
 And something evermore about to be.

(Wordsworth, *Prelude* (1805) VI 540–42)

Hopes of “becoming permeable to the indwelling “<divine> Humanity” (CN III #3911) and of throwing ourselves into the Life embodied in Nature provide us with vital energy to cultivate prudence by “the sense and the understanding,” morality by “the heart and the conscience,”

and finally, the spiritual by “the will and the reason” (AR 42). Why did Coleridge allot two faculties to each of the three stages?

In part one of this research⁴, I have shown that Coleridge as a born Platonist admitted the possibility of man’s developing “<divine> Humanity” or Logos within, by means of “discourse of reason” (*Hamlet* I ii 150, SW II 840, SM 69). “Discourse of reason” is the “best and holiest gift of Heaven and bond of union with the Giver” (F I 190); it is identical with Plato’s “*Dianoia*” explained in the simile of the Divided Line in *The Republic* (509 C–511 E).⁵ Plato’s *Dianoia* leads us to reflect on the ultimate unity, the idea of good “as the authentic source of truth and reason” (*Republic* 517 C), by making use of the visible forms of which they are a likeness. We use “*Dianoia*” to bring about “most effective shifting or conversion of the soul” from “the darkness to the brightest light of the idea of the Good” (518 C–D). In other words, those who have cultivated their “*Dianoia*” are “not willing to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and the yearning for that sojourn above” (517 C–D).

For Coleridge, “discourse of reason” is accompanied by Platonic feelings of “the sensation of want” for “the peace of God that passeth understanding” (Phil 4: 7, CN III #3911, SM 67). He considered “discourse of reason” as effective means to guide people with morals to grasp God’s peace revealing in the objects of the senses as a symbol of “<divine> Humanity” within. “Discourse of reason” is to experience “the coincidence of the human will with reason and religion;” in other words, it is to awaken the conscience to *testify* the spiritual state of “peace of God that passeth all understanding” (SM 66). According to Coleridge, “discourse of reason” enlarges the knowledge or prudence necessary to all effective faith (F I 104) through moral behavior and feelings of moral responsibility. Without it, the sense of inaptitude or “the sense of impossibility quenches all will” (F I 105) to harmonize the will and reason for the effective faith to receive and “feel within/Some consolation from above/Secret refreshings” (Milton, *Samson Agonistes*, 663–6, quoted in F I 104). Unless we utilize “the discourse of reason” as an effectual means to direct our actions and feelings, we cannot visualize “truth in its eternal and immutable source” (F I 105) to consciously appreciate its heartfelt joy. Conscious of not being able to sense ourselves clad in the peace of God, we are apt to fall into the state described in “Dejection: An Ode.”

In 1809, Coleridge defined feeling as “an act of consciousness having itself for its only Object, and not a Symbol or representative of any thing else. Thus I have . . . a Feeling of Life. -We feel what *is* in us-we have a sensation of what we find in us” (CN III #3605). His definition of feeling as such suggests that feeling guided by “the discourse of reason” and apprehended by the conscience as “a spiritual sensation” (SM 67) is worthy of the name. The effects of the grasp at his “finite will reduced to harmony with . . . reason” as a symbol of “<divine> Humanity” within are feelings of “a higher Life,” higher in that they transcend

The unsatisfyingness, the *felt* insufficiency, of all Finites in themselves, and the necessity which the Understanding feels of seeking their solution elsewhere-i.e. in an x that is not finite. (CN IV #5294)

In Coleridge’s opinion, the innate Platonic feeling of insufficiency is what distinguishes the finite from the infinite, and besides, it is what drives “the WILL (the platonic Θυμὸς⁶) (SM 65) of the finite to reflect on and yearn after the infinite “<Divine> Humanity” within symbolized as “Tri-

unity, in Reason, Religion, and the Will” (SM 62).

That Tri-unity indicates “the Idea and the *Fact*” or “the reconciliation of the Finite with the Absolute,” that is, a virtuous life as our Second Birth. Through God’s love we were born in this world with God-gifted Reason and Will, so that after our first birth we are called on to start the process to “the second Birth from morality into Life everlasting” (CNIII#3904–5) by faith using Reason and Will. For Coleridge, the Tri-unity represents a principle of or for good actions that produces “love in the New Testament” (SM 65) and “the wisdom of God, that we might know and comprehend the things that are freely given to us of God” (LS 175). The finite man could be virtuous with a steady “Intimacy with Ideas,” and in the very conflicts with the Absolute “die into a higher Life” (CNIV#5292). However as the truth of Ideas of a higher Life “reveal[s] to the senses only as contradictions, . . . it cannot be comprehended, only contemplated” (Perkins 181) with a feeling of “a higher Life.” For Coleridge, a feeling of “a higher Life” is trustworthy evidence of our reconciliation with the mysteries of “our redemption from the form of the evil one, and of our second creation or birth in the divine image” (AR 40).⁷ He regards a feeling of “a higher Life” in the same light as Plato’s feeling recollected (CNIII#4397) through love, in that both of them are motivated by the innate feeling of insufficiency.

In Plato’s *Symposium*, for instance, Diotima asserts that “the man who does not feel himself defective has no desire for that whereof he feels no defect” (204 A). Therefore, Love (*eros*), as an attendant and minister to beautiful Aphrodite, who has Resource as her father and Poverty as her mother, “is at no time either resourceless or wealthy, and furthermore he stands midway wisdom and ignorance.” That Love always seeks truths or desires to be wiser brings in the so-called “mystery of love” explained by Socrates (*Symposium* 201–12). It is reported that in one of his lectures on Shakespeare and Milton, Coleridge talked about our instinctive desire to feel pure delight of self-amelioration caused by our inclination to feel ourselves “imperfect and insufficient” due to the “twofold character” as composed of the body and of the soul. Coleridge referred to a passage from William Cartwright’s *Siedge* (Lects 1808–1819 I 314):

Love is a perfect desire of the whole being to be united to some thing or some being which is felt necessary to its perfection by the most perfect means that nature permits & reason dictates. (II iv85–8; CNIII#3514)

For Coleridge, “the most perfect means that nature permits & reason dictates” is morality by “the discourse of reason” or Platonic *dianoia* as it accumulates our experiences of feeling that we need “the Redemption and the Graces propounded to us in Christ” (BLII 243). St Augustine says that for Plato, who “believed happiness to be due to the fact that man comes to know God and to copy him,” “philosophy is the love of God” (*City of God*, VIII viii). Coleridge like St Augustine believes that our degree of happiness corresponds to how much we feel and know that our prayers for inscrutable God’s help leading our weak will to his absolute will are heard by God’s love. Effective faith to consciously feel the idea of “the peace of God” depends on our individual actual efforts to become morally better. The intense feeling toward God’s peace having its origin in “discourse of reason” is complementary to the Platonic feeling of love for gods since both moral feelings are subordinated to the rational part of the psyche and yearn for happy self-contemplation of their own God-like virtuous deeds. In *Theaetetus*, Plato lays stress on the inevitability of our morality and religion for the ascent to spiritual godlikeness:

God is in no wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly righteous, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in turn becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness. It is herein that the true cleverness of a man is found (176 C)

Coleridge's explanation of Plato's mystery of love goes:

Plato had said that by this [power of love] we rose from sensuality to affection, from affection to love, & from love to pure intellectual delight & by which we became worthy to conceive that infinite in ourselves without which it were impossible for man to have believed in a God. In short to sum up all, the most delightful of all promises was expressed to us by this practical state, namely our marriage with the Redeemer of Mankind. (Lects 1808–1819 I 315)

According to Coleridge's understanding of Plato's mystery of love, the power of love for good lets us get "pure intellectual delight" from sensual pleasures so as to become worthy to experience "the second Birth," i.e., "our marriage with the Redeemer of Mankind." Through "the second Birth," as St. Paul explains in *The Apostle to the Ephesians* (3.14–19), we come to experience "the very perfection and final bliss of the glorified spirit . . . [by] intuitive beholding of truth" (SM 48) of Christ dwelling in our hearts by faith. Search for our perfection produces knowledge (*noesis*⁸) of the love of Christ the Redeemer, as long as the search' is grounded in our "pure intellectual delight of loving God" derived from the affection for the perceived beauty by "discourse of reason" or *dianoia*. Only with Platonic love for the Redeemer, that is, with "the finite will (the platonic *Θυμὸς*) in its state of immanence in religion" (SM 65), could we transform our sensual impulse into moral feelings that makes "our marriage with the Redeemer" practically realizable. In Coleridge's opinion, the state of our mind concentrating on the "intuitive beholding of truth in its eternal and immutable source" is "the goal whereto by Heaven's grace man may attain," and it was Plato who came closest to that stage owing to "the mystery of love."

We are born able to become worthy to conceive or see face to face the infinite within, by resolving to find motives for actions not in ourselves alone, but in those who are very unlike us in character, as Coleridge believed:

How wonderfully . . . has providence provided for us to make that which is necessary for us a step of that exaltation to a higher and nobler state. . . . —In everything blending the similar with the dissimilar is the secret of all pure delight. (Lects 1808–1819 I 314)

God's absolute Will directs man to feel "happy in contemplating" himself having risen to a nobler state by loving those who have what he lacks, namely, the stronger will to love "Happiness . . . built on Virtue alone, and . . . hav[ing] Truth for its foundation" (F I 39). If the individual will sticks to its egoistic view without improving by fusing into a better will, it will be in danger of being hedged in with "satanic pride and rebellious self-idolatry" (SM 65). However, the weakness or misery of human nature exists in that we cannot love the truth as we want. Man's innate frailty as such is condensed in St. Paul's lament, "what I would, that I do not; but what I hate, that do I" (Romans 7: 15).

Coleridge found "a dim conception of the necessity of a Divine Mediator" (AR 41) concerning Plato's idea of *Θυμὸς* or "principle of high spirit." The sense of insufficiency to prevent the corruption of *Θυμὸς* by evil nature, keeping its intrinsic function as "the helper of reason" (*Re-*

public 439 E, 441 A) leads Plato to prayers.⁹ To take an example, Coleridge describes Timaeus' invocation to the gods and goddesses before delivering a discourse on the creation of the universe (*Timaeus* 27 C–29 B) as “a most beautiful mode of Prayer.” This is because “a feeling of Devotion & Dependence” on the invisible, “undisturbed by an <exertion> of the will in the motion of the organs, or by impressions on the bodily sense” enabled Timaeus to pray sincerely (CMIV 140). As Coleridge wrote to William Collins in 1818, “To feel the full force of the Christian religion, it is perhaps necessary, for many tempers, that they should first be made to feel, experimentally, the hollowness of human friendship, the presumptuous emptiness of human hopes” (CLIV 893). Coleridge recommended Collins to read George Herbert's “Flower.” In the poem, Herbert explains the wonders of God: “when we once can find and prove” that the Lord of love leads us to “see we are but flowers that glide” (44), He leads us to “a garden for us where to bide” (46). The moral feeling of insufficiency is not to “forfeit [our] Paradise by our pride” (49), by swelling through possessions. Like Herbert, Coleridge accentuates the important mediation of the Idea of Logos in disciplining the feeling of mystery at “the peace of God” by “discourse of reason” so as to evolve hollow feelings into those “fitted to be both aids and ornaments of Virtue” in reflecting on his Spirit within (SW I 570)¹⁰.

One of God's wonders is that He leads us to utilize “Discourse of reason” as an energy source of moral feelings so that

The feelings will set up their standard against the understanding whenever the understanding has renounced its allegiance to reason. (F I 432)

When Coleridge defines “Discourse of reason, as an instrumental faculty belonging to reason” (SM 69), as “the understanding or experiential faculty irradiated by the reason and the spirit” (SM 68), his distinction between reason and understanding indicates his agreement with Kant's terminology. Coleridge like Kant emphasizes the diversity of reason and understanding to defend morality and faith: reason is “the Power and the Substance of universal, necessary, self-evident & supersensual Truths,” while understanding is the power to discover scientific truths by “judging according to Sense” (CM III 557–58). Kant explains in *Critique of Pure Reason* that reason “occupies itself solely with the employment of understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience . . . , but solely in order to prescribe to the understanding its direction toward a certain unity of which it has itself no concept . . . into an *absolute* whole,” that is, God (A 326–7/B 383). Here Kant says the function of reason is to direct understanding so that the understanding as “discourse of reason” comes to derive its rank and mode of being from the Absolute. Both Plato's concept on *Dianoia* and Kant's on the understanding directed by reason, therefore, clarify that man should be sustained spiritually by “all the truths, acts, and duties that have an especial reference to the Timeless, the Permanent, the Eternal” (AR 40).

Dianoia as a culminated form of Kantian understanding strengthens our Christian faith “as a total energy of the soul” of the whole man (CM III 558). For Coleridge, *Dianoia* or “discourse of reason” leads us to become “a soul that sincerely loves God” (BL II 246) through the personal acts of realizing the ideas of reason. Those religious or moral feelings of love linked with reason play a vital role in the ethics of Plato and Kant, which, I think, attracted Coleridge's attention to their theories of mind to find “a somewhat nearer approach to the Platonic” (CLV 15) in Kant.

Coleridge's Platonic belief in the power of love as the self-determining moral energy to become like God, sustained by the sharply felt "sensation of the want" of "Happiness . . . built on Virtue alone, and . . . hav[ing] Truth for its foundation" (F I 39), led him to be aware of the greatness of Kant's philosophy that discusses the role of moral feeling as a primary factor to effect "a gradual reform in his sensuous nature" (Religion 43).

II : Coleridge on the Kantian growth of the spirit

Coleridge's earnest study of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) began at about the age of twenty-eight when he became more proficient in German after a ten-month visit to Germany in 1798–1800. However, his letter to Thomas Poole¹¹, dated May 5, 1796, tells us that he had paid attention to "the new Kantian S[ystem—]" already at the time, realizing the importance of learning the difference between the "Metaphysic[s]" of Kant and the Associationism of Locke and Hartley, so as to advance his knowledge of "Men as an *Intellectual* Being" (CL I 209). Anyway the letter indicates that Coleridge harbored a plan for a lengthy stay in Germany, partly to study Kant; as a matter of fact, though, before its fulfillment, he had the good fortune to meet William and Dorothy Wordsworth in the spring of 1797 and write *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*. He set sail from Yarmouth for Hamburg on 16 September 1798¹², two days before the publication of *Lyrical Ballads* including *The Rime* (Ashton 145).

Within two decades of studying in Germany, Coleridge declared, "I reverence Immanuel Kant with my whole heart and soul and believe him to be the only philosopher, for all men who have the power of thinking" (CLIV 792). Actually, he began delivering lectures on German philosophy, emphasising the greatness of Kant from the standpoint of Platonism. Coleridge, like the enigmatic philosopher Albert Knox in *Sophie's World*,¹³ explained that Kant's *Critiques* differed from empirical writings of Locke and Hartley in that Kant admitted not only sensory perception but reason as contributors to man's knowledge. According to Coleridge, "Kant . . . the Platonist" "secured" the nature of space and time as "the perception of a pre-existent light" (P Lects 389–390). Empiricists thought the mind conforms to things perceived by the senses, but Kant thought "the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition¹⁴" of objects as well (CPR B xvii). This is often called the "Copernican revolution in philosophy," as Kant, in the preface to the second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*¹⁵, compared his originality in pointing out *a priori* or innate way of knowing¹⁶, such as the notions of time and space, cause and effect which have no objective existence, to "Copernicus' primacy hypothesis" (CPR B xvi)¹⁷

In *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant wrote, "our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our faculty of knowledge . . . supplies from itself" (B 1). Kant asserted that the mind is both a passive receiver of external impressions and an active creator of our knowledge as it controls the way the world appears to us. As Peter J. Kitson says, "the attraction of Kant's philosophy to Coleridge and the Romantics was that it assigned an active and creative role to the mind in the formation of human knowledge" (39). Kant questioned Locke's major premise that "the mind [is] . . . white paper void of all characters, without any *ideas*" (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, II I 2), though his *Essay* was the ground-

work of the Enlightenment at the time.

Kant modified Socrates' or Plato's idea that "knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the process of reasoning about them; for it is possible, apparently, to apprehend being and truth by reasoning, but not by sensation" (*Theaetetus* 186 D¹⁸). Kant pointed out the difference between perception and knowledge. It is not because, as Plato said, "knowledge is not in the sensations," but because knowledge exhibits an exquisite balance between sensations and the *a priori* reasoning that decides our way of receiving external stimulation as, for instance, taking place in the flow of time. Thus as Sophie rightly understands, Kant "could think both the rationalists and the empiricists were right up to a point" (*Sophie's World*, 271).

What is important, in the philosophical lecture mentioned above, is that Coleridge made additional remarks on two kinds of truths Kant dealt with: mathematical truths of science, and truths of experience concerning morality and religion (P Lects 388–389). The former are universal, while the latter are contingent. Coleridge admitted as one of Kant's great merits that he rated the latter kind of particular truths, though they are susceptible to alteration in the process of accumulating individual experiences, higher than scientific truths of the intellect or speculative reason. Truths of experiences made by willpower are those of the practical reason that controls our moral behavior. According to Coleridge, Kant by reflecting on the human mind found that there is

. . . a far higher and nobler constituent of his being, his will, the practical reason and this does not announce itself by arguing but by direct command and precept: thou shalt do to others as thou wouldst be done by: thou shalt act so that there shall be no contradiction in thy being. (P Lects 389)

Being the source of objective ideas "of *God, freedom, and immortality*" (CPR bxxx), the practical reason issues imperatives which "tell us *what ought to happen*-although perhaps it never does happen-therein differing from *laws of nature*, which relate only to *that which happens*" (CPR A 802/B 830). The speculative reason lacks the ability to comprehend the ideas of practical reason that transcend "actual correspondents in outward nature" (P Lects 389, CPR Bxxx). According to Kant, those ideas of practical reason are, thus, regulative¹⁹ in controlling our everyday behavior. The imperative of practical reason is moral actions of our own free will. Such actions as determined "independently of sensuous impulses" (CPR A 802/B 830), namely, the feelings of pleasure and pain, the desires and inclinations (A 15/B 29), represent our free will that enables us to act only for motives of pure practical reason. Therefore,

. . . in the construction of a system of pure morality these empirical concepts must necessarily be brought into the concepts of duty, as representing either a hindrance, which we have to overcome, or an allurement, which must not be made into a motive.

(CPR A 15/B 29)

However, at the same time, Kant says it might be impossible, or if not so, very difficult, for us to decide our will independently of subjective self-interested feelings of pleasure and pain. Non-scientific but philosophical ideas of God, of Free-will, of Immortality cannot be comprehended by speculative reason, yet practical reason commands us unconditionally to realize those ideas (CJ § 91, F I 112). This is because to ignore or disobey the precept "thou shalt do to others as thou wouldst be done by" means to become, in Coleridge's word, "a traitor to [your]

nature-nay, even to [your] common nature,” incurring self-contradiction (P Lects 389). If forced to carry out incomprehensible ideas, we wait for divine aid (RL 180). Kant’s famous remark, “I have . . . found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith” (CPR xxx) is consistent with Coleridge’s opinion in 1820:

[In Kant’s critical philosophy] is contained all that can be *learnt*—& as to the results, you have a firm faith in God, the responsible Will of Man, and Immortality—& Kant will demonstrate to you, that this Faith is . . . confirmed by the Reason & Understanding, but grounded on Postulates authorized & substantiated solely by the *Moral* Being.

(CLV 14–15)

It must be noted that Coleridge had a high opinion of Kant’s philosophy for placing morality ahead of faith. Coleridge was “anxious to have [Kant] clearly within a religious context” (SW II 834 n). He examined Kant’s philosophy, applying it to the scriptural and the Platonic division of the prudential, moral, and spiritual. The relation between “The Responsible Will of Man” and God’s grace was explained by Kant in his *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793). Coleridge admitted in *Biographia Literaria* that it “took possession on [him] as with a giant’s hand” along with *Critique of Pure Reason* (first edition A, 1781; second edition B, 1787), *Critique of Critical Judgement* (1790)(BL I 153).

In *Religion*, Kant clearly distinguishes what man can do through his own efforts upholding the laws of freedom and what man can do only with supernatural help (179). As we cannot know anything about how and on what conditions grace works upon us, all we should do is to “aim at nothing but our morality” (180). Keith Ward says in *The Development of Kant’s View of Ethics* that Kant’s ethics are “unmistakably Christian in origin” (167) but “any sense of personal fellowship with God, revelation from God or redemption by God is entirely lacking” (168). Kant, however, stresses the significance of our making ourselves worthy to receive or susceptible to supernatural help by doing our best to seek “kingdom of God within us”(RL 181).

According to Kant, the Platonic “original moral predisposition itself in us” (RL 44) indicates God within. At the same time, he does admit our need for God’s help since what we can do to be a good man is inadequate without incomprehensible heavenly assistance (RL 40). Kant was just afraid of “allow[ing] ourselves to fall into the indolence of awaiting from above, in passive leisure, what we should seek within” (RL 180). We are apt to cherish and cling to the illusion of the self-centered ideas of supernatural help, and forget to be active in doing good to others:

The concept of a supernatural accession to our moral, though deficient, capacity and even to our not wholly purified and certainly weak disposition to perform our entire duty, is a transcendent concept, and is a bare idea, of whose reality no experience can assure us.

(RL 179)

Elinor Shaffer in “Metaphysics of Culture: Kant and Coleridge’s *Aids to Reflection*” wrote that the aim of *Aids* for Coleridge was to argue against Kant’s “pride of reason” (212) in *Religion* that declared the importance of doing good without referring to the idea of “justification by faith.” However, in *Religion* which was highly esteemed by Coleridge, Kant did admit our need of faith to strengthen our weak imperfect will. Knowing our weakness, Kant dared us to be responsible in morals first so as not only to wait lazily “in passive leisure” for inscrutable invisible help from above.

Practical reason gives us universal moral law as a “guiding thread” (GMM 57) to strengthen the inborn predisposition to Good. Moral law issues imperatives that we “ought” (*Sollen*) to “be good,” determining our will by concepts of reason; we “ought” to derive our actions from the moral law (GMM 80–1). Those imperatives of moral law or practical reason are expressed by an “ought” as we are apt to do things that cause the plaint of St. Paul, “What I would do, that I do not” (Rome 7: 15; RL cxxi) due to the inclination to yield precedence to pathological, sensuous feelings over moral feelings as “respect for the moral law” (CPrR 78). In other words, we often determine our will of action not by the universal, objective moral law, but instead by purely subjective feeling of pleasure or pain, valid only for this or that particular person at that particular time.

According to Kant’s Platonic view, we never lose the incentive to become better men despite the Fall, which means we cannot completely lose our moral feeling of respect for the moral law (RL 40)²⁰. Accordingly, one ought to let one’s moral feeling “produced solely by reason” (CPrR 79) work as an incentive to make let the moral law itself a maxim, a subjective practical principle valid only for one’s own will (CPrR 17). Since our subjective feelings affect the will, the moral law declares as “categorical imperative” (GMM 82; CPrR 32) that it is our duty to constrain our sensuous feelings by practical reason to ease “a conflict of maxims” (CPrR 17) between sensuous feelings and moral feelings.²¹ Virtuous people are those who always strive to progress in determining their will only in respect to a desired end: “the autonomy of the will” (GMM 108; CPrR 33). When achieved, we become able to do our duty “for the sake of the moral law.” It is not enough to do one’s duty conforming to the moral law because conformity is “only too contingent and precarious” (GMM 58)²² for man “belonging to the sensible world and yet to the intelligible world at the same time” (GMM 121). It is our duty, therefore, to cultivate our imperfect will, with help from moral feelings, to be perfectly good like the divine will so that “there are no imperatives . . . because ‘I will’ is already of itself necessarily in harmony with the [moral] law” (CPrR 81).

“[The] holiness of will is . . . a practical ideal which must necessarily serve as a model which all finite rational beings must strive toward even though they cannot reach it” (CPrR 33). To put it another way, we must assume as a “postulate” the existence of God who directs those striving to “do the duty for duty’s sake” to the highest good in which the harmony between the sensible and the intelligible is established (CPrR 128–9, 133; RL 42). “As a method of awakening moral sentiment” for establishing harmony, Kant considers self-reflection with the highest wonder on “the very incomprehensibility of the original predisposition itself in us” (RL 44–45). We always draw on the sensible, yet at the same time, we can transcend such reality by moral actions that feature our original predisposition to good. Our highest wonder is the sublime feeling of our spiritual “unity” in “continual progress from bad to better” to come through “a kind of rebirth, as it were a new creation (John III, 5)” for God (RL 43).

III. Coleridge on Kant’s Moral Feeling

Coleridge agreed with Kant that commanding practical reason requires cultivation of a sensible inclination corresponding to the inherent moral law to attain the will of God so as always

be able to “act so that there shall be no contradiction in thy being.” It is because, in Coleridge’s opinion, Kant’s practical reason gradually leads man through his everyday experiences to “all the harmony of nature,” issuing “a positive command which, if he disobeys, he is at once a traitor to his nature-nay, even to his common nature” (P Lects 389). Kant led us to “fe[e]l to the full that the reason itself, considered as merely intellectual, was but a subordinate part of our nature; that there was a higher part, the will and the conscience” (P Lects 390). As I have mentioned above, Coleridge took the conscience and heart as the main faculties for our morality, and the will and reason for spiritual religion. He thought the categorical imperative of Kant’s practical reason demands us the unending spiritual assent of our heart, will and conscience. This indicates Coleridge’s agreement with Kant’s view explained mostly in *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) which he read in 1809 (CM III 263 n).

Paul Guyer insists in his *Kant and the Experience of Freedom* (1993) that Kant’s “classical ethical writings of the 1780’s [such as *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason*] may have needed to be supplemented by the moral aesthetics he developed in the 1790’s” (24). In Kant’s earlier theory of pure morality, the cultivation of moral feeling has nothing to do with duty because feelings of empirical origin must be treated just as “a hindrance” to overcome to do one’s duty. However, in the “Doctrine of Virtue” (Part II of the *Metaphysics of Morals*), we can find

. . . Kant’s recognition that cultivation of a sensible disposition favorable to the performance of duty, which in his earlier writing may have seemed irrelevant to the meritorious performance of duty or even, at least in the eyes of his critics, inimical to it, is in fact part of our general duty toward ourselves to advance the perfection of our whole character in respect to the end of morality. (Guyer 318)

Coleridge’s admiration of Kant’s *Religion* and his reading of *Metaphysics of Morals* comes from Kant’s correction in the 1790s of his own writings of the 1780s. It seems reasonable, therefore, to add a few words such as in brackets after “Coleridge” in Kathleen Coburn’s remark: “Kant’s ‘stoic principle’ was too restrictive of emotion and imagination to allow for the full exercise of personality that Coleridge [and Kant himself in his later works of the 1790s] demanded, especially in religion and art” (“Introduction” to P Lects 63).

Coleridge called Kant’s concept of duty stoic in 1817:

I reject Kant’s *stoic* principle, as false, unnatural, and even immoral, where in his *Critik der Practischen Vernun[f]t* he treats the affections as indifferent . . . in ethics, and would persuade us that a man who disliking, and without any feeling of Love for, Virtue yet *acted* virtuously, because and only because it was his *Duty*, is more worthy of our esteem, than the man whose *affections* were aidant to, and congruous with, his Conscience. (CLIV 791–92)

Coleridge was right as Kant, in *Critique of Practical Reason*, admired Duty for its power to deny all inclinations:

Thou sublime and mighty name . . . gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience)—a law before which all inclinations are dumb even though they secretly work against it: what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations . . . (89)

Coleridge did not agree with Kant's tendency to respect those who behave themselves virtuously "without any feeling of Love for Virtue" more than those who behave themselves virtuously on impulse based on a feeling of Love for Virtue. For the Kant of CprR, the sole genuine moral feeling of respect for the moral law is divine, and it is impossible for us always dallied with pathological impulses to support duty (88). Additionally, Kant explains that "love to God as inclination (pathological love) is impossible, for He is not an object of the senses . . . it cannot be commanded, for it is not possible for man to love someone merely on command. . . . To love God means in this sense to like to do His commandment, and to love one's neighbor means to like to practice all duties toward him" (86).

Kant's view of love in CPrR is preserved in *Metaphysics of Morals* where love is explained as "a matter of feeling, not of willing, and I cannot love because I will to, still less because I ought to . . . so a *duty to love* is an absurdity" (MM 203). It is natural that Coleridge, who identified the individual will to Platonic $\Theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ that gives rise to the "mystery of love," objected to what Kant said concerning love:

. . . I doubt this independence of Love on the Will, and doubt even Love's being in its essence merely eine Sache der Empfindung, a mere matter of *feeling*, i.e. a somewhat *found* in us which is not of and from us
(CM III 264)

As I have noted, love, for Coleridge should be made "of and from" the "Tri-unity of reason, religion, and will." Thus love is the moral feeling accompanying moral or religious actions. Love as such is "a feeling of Sympathy" generated by "a pure will." "The sense of Duty" guides us to "produce, Sympathy itself as an Action/?—This I [i.e. Coleridge] think very important/—Nay, it is proved by Scripture/& Kant therefore, p.13 *Metap. der Sitten*, very unfairly explains away the word Love into Beneficence" (CN I #1705).

According to Kant, our feelings of love for neighbors are the effects, not the thrust, of beneficent deeds towards neighbors:

Beneficence is a duty. If someone practices it often and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention, he eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped. So the saying "you ought to *love* your neighbors as yourself" [Matt. 22.39] does not mean that you ought immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, *do good* to your fellow man, and your beneficence will produce love of man in you (as an aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general).
(MM 203)

Coleridge was not satisfied with Kant's tendency to separate feeling of love from good action. For him, the good deeds required by the conscience, as "the spiritual sense" to feel the peace of God overflowing from the ideal state of "Tri-unity, in Reason, Religion, and the Will," must come from love, otherwise they are not good enough to be justified by the conscience. For the conscience, to feel the peace of God does not mean mere passiveness but "an act of passiveness" because without acts of love and faith as the principle of the scripture, in other words, without "the consciousness of *responsibility*," we cannot effectively be passive to the divine consolation (SW II 836). Coleridge regarded faith and love as heaven-born "good impulses: because they are the powers, that impel us to do what we ought to do" (SW I 571). Faith or love is the power to make us partake of "the holiness of will," "the autonomy of the will" (CprR 33) repre-

senting “God *der Wille*-Christ *Logos*,” or “redemptive Reason” (CN I #1705, SW II 843). Faith is “a Light, a form of Knowing, a Beholding of Truth” with an energy of the individual will relating to “the Whole Moral Man” (SW II 844). That “we are taught [by Christ *Logos*] to give a *feeling of reality* to the higher by [the] association . . . with the Lower” proves the mighty energy given to the individual will of those full of faith and love to feel and know the happiness of “the mystery of love,” of experiencing the Godlike “identity of Act and Being” (SW II 846) that enables us always “to do the duty for its own sake.”

Coleridge like Kant admits that we cannot attain God’s will; accordingly, to keep on striving to respect and experience the Idea of God’s free will from the necessity to avoid self-destruction is our duty as finite rational beings. Unlike Kant, however, Coleridge believed that “it [moral law] must not only our Guide, but likewise our Impulse-Like a strong current, it must make a visible Road on the Sea, & drive us along the road” (CN I 1705). Unlike Kant, Coleridge thinks that moral law commands us to get power through faith to enforce the idea of reason. Faith and love are the forces powering our “second birth” as a spiritual being like an angel:

Power + idea = angel.

Idea – power = man, or Prometheus. (CM I 706)

Man is a miserable, imperfect being whose

Motives imply weakness and the existence of evil and temptation. The Angelic Nature would act from Impulse alone. A due medium of Motives and Impulse is the only practicable object of our moral Philosophy here. (TT I 139)

Here in this fallen world, Kant’s “respect for the moral law” is possible only through religious motives for “*loving* your neighbors as yourself.” Men act with motives, and the purest motives come from “a regenerate,” i.e., “spiritual State” consisting of three principles or impulses:

1. Love of God–2. Love of our Neighbor for the Love of God. 3. An undefiled Conscience, which prizes above all every comprehensible advantage that *Peace* of God, which passeth all understanding! (SW I 571)

Coleridge emphasizes that as imperfect creatures we ought to know that we need those principles to “do the duty for its own sake” like angels. Duty should be done by “good will,” so we should know that we need love and faith to attain the power of the Divine Will to overcome our assumed difficulties & limitations.

“Every Consideration, whether of Hope or of Fear, which *is*, and which is *adopted* by us . . . as a MEANS of *producing* such Impulses in our Hearts, is so far a *right* and *desirable* consideration” (SW I 571). Kant requires actions first to experience “a spiritual Life,”²³ but Coleridge points out the necessity of our meditation on “the assimilative power of faith and love” (AR 322) to Life, the *Logos* whose infinite Love promises us the happiness of self-contemplation (SW I 156). Kant says, “*do good* to your fellow man, and your beneficence will produce love of man in you.” Coleridge, however, suggests that good deeds be done out of good impulses of love, of good motives, gifted from the infinite love of *Logos* to enable us to feel the real happiness of doing goods as a Whole Moral man. For Coleridge, love of man is a precondition for the beneficence that represents the happiness of “a spiritual Life.”

Coleridge thinks unnatural Kant’s stoic principle that “treats the affections as indifferent in ethics,” since “reverence for the LAW of Reason/now this truly is a feeling” is “a Necessity im-

posed on us by our own Will” as Inclination (CN I #1710). It is not “an imposed Necessity” so “reverence for the Law” excludes any dislikes and leads man to a knowledge of spiritual happiness. A moral feeling is thus “a self-created” and at the same time “a received passive Feeling” from Logos within. It is an outcome of “an act of passiveness” to prophesy that we cannot live without the energies of God’s Will to redeem the inclination of “Man’s double Nature . . . as Man & God” (CN I #1680; #1710). Coleridge tried to draw people’s attention to the mysterious feeling that satisfies our natural desire to be able to realize the idea of God who created us. His Platonism convinced him that the essence of man is a feeling of “desire of Self-completion with a restless & inextinguishable Love” for Good (CN I #1680).

We should not forget that when Coleridge rejected in 1817 Kant’s “stoic principle” in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason*, he had already read Kant’s later works which stressed the important role of our moral feelings as “subjective conditions” to carry out our duty (MM 201). For example, in *Religion*, Kant justifies the stoics’ attacks with virtuous courage and valor (Platonic *Θυμὸς*) against enemies that hinder the development of our inherent natural goodness. They are better than “hang[ing] back waiting for help without,” entirely mistrusting the power of feeling to become morally better (RL 50). To make them worthy of the assistance without, they keep on fighting, yet, Kant says, they are mistaken in looking upon “the merely undisciplined natural inclinations” as their enemies.²⁴

Natural inclinations, *considered in themselves*, are good, that is, not a matter of reproach, and it is not only futile to want to extirpate them but to do so would also be harmful and blameworthy. Rather, let them be tamed and instead of clashing with one another they can be tamed and instead of clashing with one another they can be brought into harmony in a wholeness which is called happiness. Now the reason which accomplishes this is termed *prudence*. (RL 51)

Kant’s idea that prudence promotes the happiness of acting as an integrated whole is similar to Coleridge’s, and, in terms of the latter, similar to the biblical and Platonic ways of thinking. Like Coleridge, Kant believes that man’s ultimate happiness should come from “*a practical faith in this Son of God*” as an ideal of “complete moral perfection” (RL 54–55). Man feels happiness when he can

look upon himself as an object not unworthy of divine approval who is conscious of such a moral disposition as enables him to have a well-grounded confidence in himself and to *believe* that, under like temptations and afflictions (so far as these are made the touchstone of that idea), he would be loyal unswervingly to the archetype of humanity and, by faithful imitation, remain true to his exemplar. (RL 55)

Ideas of practical reason request “respect and imitation” of Son of God (CPR A 318/B 375) so as to be worthy to receive the Light of God. Kant like Coleridge in *Statesman’s Manual* (97) and *Aids to Reflection* (385–387), refers to John 1.12 (RL 54):

. . . as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name.

Man’s universal duty is to “*elevate ourselves*” (RL 54) to deserve to be called “the sons of God” by “practical faith.” Faith guides us to the happiness of reflecting on ourselves as bearing the likeness of God. This spiritual elevation means, in Coleridge’s word, the ascent from “prudence”

and “moral religion” in the world of *phenomena*, to the sphere of “spiritual religion” in the Platonic world of *noumena*. Kant asserts the necessity of Platonic ideas in the field of the practical to recognize that ideas produced by the reason “have their own reality” (CPR A 314/B 371, Seung 62). The ideas of “God, Free-will, and immortality” of practical reason “give [us] power” to elevate ourselves to the “ideal of moral perfection, that is, to this archetype of the moral disposition in all its purity” (RL 54). Platonic ideas direct us to adopt as our motives what reason tells us in the form of imperatives regarding “what ought to happen.” It was Kant who confirmed Coleridge’s conviction that, in the stage of Morality, Platonic ideas “serve as an indispensable foundation for every approach to moral perfection” (CPR A 315/B 372); Platonic constitutive ideas let us transcend the bounds of experience to the spiritual reality of their own making which is “by no means mere fictions of the brain” (CPR A 314/B 371). True knowledge of the spiritual is that of “the kingdom of God . . . within you” (Luke 17.21) as the product of ideas of practical reason (RL 126).

For Kant, one command of practical reason is the individual search for the inscrutable holiness within, using all functions of our soul, including moral feelings:

Investigation into the inner nature of all kinds of faith which concern religion invariably encounters a *mystery*, i.e., something *holy* which may indeed be *known* by each single individual but can not be *made known* publicly, that is, shared universally. Being something *holy*, it must be moral, and so an object of reason, and it must be capable of being known from within adequately for practical uses, and yet, as something *mysterious*, not for theoretical use, since in this case it would have to be capable of being shared with everyone and made known publicly. (RL 129)

Kant admits that ideas regulative in the world of phenomena can be constitutive in “spiritual religion,” so as Orsini explains,

Coleridge was wrong when he classed Kant as mainly an Aristotelian. Rather is Kant to be considered as the thinker who brought Plato’s ideas from heaven down to earth and made them functions of the human understanding. (135)

However, it would be better to say that Coleridge found the Platonic elements, “a somewhat nearer approach to the Platonic,” in Kant’s *Religion and Metaphysics of Morals*, so by criticizing Kant’s stoicism in the *Groundwork*, while admiring the *Religion*, he intended to arouse people’s interest in Kant’s return to the ethics of Platonic ideas. As T.K. Seung explains in his *Kant’s Platonic Revolution in Moral and Political Philosophy* (1994), Kant in fact comes to admit “immanent” rather than “transcendent” Platonic ideas for practical uses in *Metaphysics of Morals* (151).

In *Metaphysics of Morals*, “moral feeling,” “conscience,” “love of one’s neighbor,” and “respect for oneself (*self-esteem*)” are introduced as four virtues that form “subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty All of them are natural predispositions (*praedispositio*) of the mind . . . for being affected by concepts of duty, antecedent predispositions on the side of *feeling* [*ästhetisch*]” (MM 201). Being subjective like general feelings of pleasure and pain, moral feeling does not yield knowledge. It is not our duty to accumulate moral feeling; just to “cultivate it, and to strengthen it through wonder at its inscrutable source.” Coleridge found that Kantian moral feeling facilitates “the responsible Will of Man,” namely, “the auton-

omy of will.” It urges us wonderfully to determine actions through motives which are derived only from the practical reason independently of sensuous impulses.

“Conscience” for Kant means “the inner judge of all free actions.” It is “the subjective principle of being accountable to God for all one’s deeds,” in other words, of “submitting to the will of a holy Being.” Conscience unavoidably leads us to the Idea of a Supreme Being given to us not “*objectively*, by theoretical reason, but only *subjectively*, by practical reason” (MM 234–5). Our duty then is to use every means to hear the voice of the inner judge. This will be linked with the Delphic command to “know yourself.” Kant emphasizes that “moral self-knowledge, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of one’s heart that are quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom” (MM 236). Duty to know with wonder the incomprehensible source of moral feeling and conscience brings about self-respect for the innate law always commanding benevolence to love our neighbors. Moral self-knowledge as such removes obstacles that weaken our natural predisposition to “do the duty for its own sake.” To know the inborn noble predisposition by conscience to do the good restrains us from “*egotistical self-esteem* which takes mere wishes-wishes that, however ardent, always remain empty of deeds-for proof of a good heart” (MM 236).

IV : Conclusion: Coleridge’s search for the moral feeling of “angelic happiness”

As Kant admits, to try to strengthen susceptibility to subjective feelings like “*moral feeling, conscience, love* of one’s neighbor, and *respect* for oneself” means to prepare the way for morality. Knowing about those inherent inscrutable predispositions to do good can be looked upon as worthwhile only if it quickens our personal practice of morality. Therefore, Kant does not have a high opinion of praying as it is apt to be “only a wish declared inwardly before someone who knows hearts” (MM 236). In *Religion*, he says that the spirit of prayer is “a heartfelt wish to be well-pleasing to God in our every act and an abstention” (183). Coleridge, however, cannot agree with Kant as regards prayers:

. . . in the “Religion innerhalb den Grenzen der reinen Vernunft”—It takes for granted that Prayer is not an *act*, but a mere wishing—O! who ever *prayed*, that has not an hundred times felt that scarce an act of Life was so difficult as to determine to *pray*? Effective Resolve to Heart-amendment must have commenced, before true Prayer can be uttered
(CM III 267-8)

For Coleridge, prayer is “an act of Life,” so he cannot admit Kant’s way of taking it as “a mere wishing.” However, Coleridge here seems to struggle just over the exact wording. His views on prayer have much in common with those of Kant’s. Kant admits that private prayers are “firmly to establish [the] goodness *in ourselves*, and repeatedly to awaken the disposition of goodness in the heart” (RL 181). God “penetrates to the intelligible ground of the heart” (RL 43), so prayers are to reflect on higher assistance. They are to stimulate subjective conditions such as “moral feelings, conscience, love of man and respect for oneself” so as to be able to think of his moral actions as worthy to receive “some supernatural cooperation.”

When Coleridge says “effective Resolve to Heart-amendment must have commenced, be-

fore true Prayer can be uttered,” like Kant points out the need of our prayers to awaken and quicken the original angelic susceptibility to God’s help. They both try to define “true Prayer” as true moral service of God; prayer for Coleridge is

. . . Faith passing into act—a union of the will and the Intellect realizing in an Intellectual act. It is the whole man that prays, less than this is wishing (CM I 702)

Coleridge regards the inner harmony, the coherent whole of the sensible and the intelligible, as the key concept that differentiates sincere prayers acceptable to God and fetish prayers as mere wishing of self-love or as “the means of self-delusion” (CN III #3355). This is because prayer as “an act of life” should be an effective means for “progression” and “ascending gradations” (“Theory of Life,” SW II 505) to an inward perfection with the help of divine cooperation.

Kant also refers to man’s moral perfection. He says “it is man’s duty to strive for th[e] perfection,” but “man’s striving after this end always remains only a progress from one perfection to another” because of the frailty of human nature (MM 241). Man’s perfection draws on the effective cultivation of our predisposition and capacities so that practical reason might use them to fulfill the duty of beneficence out of love of our neighbors (MM 239).

Now it becomes clear that what Coleridge considers our duty to reach is what Kant considers the state closest to perfection for the principle of religion. We make religion our duty for practical purposes so as to judge that we can do what the law tells us unconditionally to do, namely, the duty to cultivate our impulses of nature, “powers of spirit, mind, and body” (MM 186, 239). The Idea of God serving as the incentive in our struggles for inner perfection enables us to believe our love for others can be “the *maxim of benevolence* (practical love), which results in beneficence” (MM 244). Thus Kant too comes to admit the existence of universal love that cannot be described just as mere subjective, contingent feeling.

Both Coleridge and Kant conclude that the perfect happiness of fulfilling the duty to “love your neighbor as yourself,” harmonizing the will of one with that of another, can be regarded as attainable once we make religion a duty to ourselves. This is because

God’s end with regard to the human race (in creating and guiding it) can be thought only as proceeding from *love*, that is, as the *happiness* of men. But the principle of God’s will with regard to the *respect* (awe) due to Him, which limits the effects of love, that is, the principle of God’s right, can be none other than that of *justice*. To express this in human terms, God has created rational beings from the need, as it were, to have something outside Himself which He could love or by which He could also be loved. (MM 277)

Kant idea of God written in 1797 is surprisingly similar to Coleridge’s “Reflections on God’s Ideas” of 1806 which I quoted above. Coleridge had not read Kant’s *Metaphysics of Morals* then but it is no wonder that they employed “the principle of religion” to actualize their concept of duty to “reconcile the man with himself, with others [including God] and with the world” while tempering all impulses (F I 523). God’s love for us is the proof of our happiness even in struggling to cultivate love and respect for others. Religion teaches us that our prayers for the keen subjective susceptibilities to the moral law to be worthy of God’s love must themselves be proof of being loved by God.

By defining religion as a duty of man to himself, Kant also seems to employ the scriptural

and Platonic division or ascent from prudence, to morality which is objectively logical, and then to spiritual religion which is only subjectively logical. Spiritual religion that “seeks its summit in the imitation of the Divine nature” by harmonizing the finite will with the will absolute, promises us the angelic happiness of performing the right actions at will, that is, praying. Prayer is “the focus of Religion” that deals with “the relation of a Will to a Will, the Will in each instance being *deeper* than Reason for of a Person to a Person” (CNIV#5383). What Coleridge explains as “effective Resolve to Heart-amendment” required for a true prayer is equivalent to Kant’s cultivation of moral feelings as a susceptibility to be moved by the idea of God’s love for man which God allows us to create by pure practical reason for our ultimate happiness. Our thoughts or an impulse to the prayer, “Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief” (Mark 9.24; CN III#3353, RL 178) are what Coleridge and Kant admitted as the power of constitutive ideas that leads us to become worth regeneration.

For Coleridge, a true prayer should be accompanied by “the faith to which Blessing is promised” (CLIII478); therefore, it should be counted as “the sole instrument of regeneration” as “a good Gift of God” (CNIII#3355) that raises man to the spiritual imitation of God-likeness. When Coleridge says that true prayers are the proof of our “turning [our] thoughts into acts by connecting them with the idea of the redeeming God” (CM I 702), acts mean our continual progressive struggles for perfection. “By prayer alone” we attain “a lively Faith” as

. . . the Effects . . . of the *moral* Being after difficult Conquest, the total state of the Spirit after the victorious Struggle, in <which> and by which *the* WILL has preserved its perfect Freedom by a deep and vehement Energy of perfect Obedience to the pure, practical Reason, or Conscience! Thence flows in upon and fills the Soul that Peace, which pisseth Understanding
(CNIII#3911)

For both Coleridge and Kant, prayers are to cultivate our susceptibility to the moral law. But what slightly differs is that Coleridge considers conscience “a spiritual sensation” to apprehend God’s peace. In consequence, he stresses more than Kant the happiness we feel every time we unite by prayers with our “ideas of the redeeming God,” with Life as progression toward perfection (CNIV#5383). According to Coleridge, the difference between the general conception and the Idea is that “we could derive [from the latter] a Rule of Guidance, directing us in the . . . amendment, improvement, or modification of an existing state;” “An Idea is a Form presenting & presupposing an ultimate end, appropriately” (CNIV#4940). Coleridge makes it his duty to grasp “the peace of God,” the ultimate end the Idea presents, with the conscience, which means he feels a great deal of “his moral responsibility” to apply “the peace of God” to the motives of his conduct (F II 295). In this way, he succeeds in proving our chance of experiencing the power of our will to maintain the obedience to God against all the might of Nature.

Coleridge’s aim of writing *The Friend* was to show his readers that “the principle of religion” should be “the true and sole Ground of Morality, or Virtue, as distinguished from Prudence” and that it could be “the Origin and Growth of moral Impulses, as distinguished from external and immediate Motives” (F II 18). Now it can be said that those purposes announced in the “Prospectus of the Friend” in 1809 reflected Kant’s ideas concerning the significance of moral feelings in *Religion*, which “took possession of Coleridge” about 1802 (CM III 304 n), and *Metaphysics of Morals*, which he read in 1809. Coleridge just called what the reason feels the

need of and what the conscience apprehends, “the peace of God” and by doing so, made it his duty to cultivate his impulses to feel the Godlike spiritual calmness, controlling less worthy impulses.

Kant points out that we, being fully conscious indwelling evil principle, naturally want to postulate that God gives us power to nurture our “natural predisposition to Good” so we can believe that “duty demands nothing of us which we cannot do” (RL 40). Our moral law commands us to obey Duty for its own sake, that is, we ought to found our love of God and our neighbors on “an absolute Peace & Harmony between all parts of human Nature” (CN II #2556). But in order to love, as weak and imperfect beings, we should repress wishes or inclinations contrary to what the moral law commands. Coleridge and Kant admit that “to perform Duties absolutely from the sense of Duty is the Ideal, which perhaps no human Being ever can arrive at, but which every human Being ought to try to draw near unto” (CN II #2556). Love having no struggles implies, in Coleridge’s word, the “angelic *Happiness*” of contemplating Duty as the Symbol of Pleasure due to the absolute coincidence between Duty and Pleasure. On the contrary, “human *Happiness*” consists in “finding his Duty in enjoyment.” In that notebook entry of 1805, Coleridge emphasizes the fact that in proportion as our love produces “angelic Happiness,” we are necessarily transmuted into more spiritual beings and, “in a most sublime sense,” we come to “see God face to face.” Coleridge’s thinking that true, sincere love transforms us into spiritual beings is equivalent to the Platonic mystery of love and Kant’s concept of love as a subjective condition to do the categorical imperative of practical reason or the conscience.

In *Religion and Metaphysics of Morals* Kant examines the potentialities of “human Happiness” for the “sublime” transition to Platonic “angelic Happiness.” Coleridge in addition to the Kantian attempt as such, tries to describe, if existing, the state of “angelic Happiness” given by God the Redeemer if we believe in “the Idea of the LIVING GOD” (AR 168). According to Coleridge, at the birth of religion, namely, of “angelic Happiness,”

“we receive the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father; the Spirit itself bearing witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God.” (Rom. viii. 15, 16.) In RELIGION there is no abstractions. To the unity and infinity of the Divine Nature, of which it is the partaker, it adds the fullness, and to the fullness the grace and the creative overflowing. That which intuitively it at once beholds and adores, praying always, and rejoicing always—that doth it tend to become. (SM 90)

“Angelic Happiness” relies on how far we make good use of what we have received from God. “The spirit of adoption” above certifies the love of God that leads us to “god-like transfiguration of all the vital, intellectual, moral, and spiritual powers” (SM 91). We can increase our activities of love according as we dwell in God’s love by faith. Our godlikeness as a consolation from God is measured by how much we “finitely express the unity of the infinite Spirit by being a total act of the soul” (SM 90). Redeemed to be able to behold intuitively the unity and infinity of the Lord, our reason and understanding regenerated are brought together, and we come to behave according to “that undivided Reason, neither merely speculative or merely practical, but both in one” (SM 72). Consequently, our moral feelings change from “human happiness” to “angelic happiness.”

“Human happiness” derives from the practical understanding or “discourse of reason”

which as “a Principle of Action . . . select[s] and adapt[s] Means” (AR 413) to attain “the autonomy of the will.” “Angelic happiness” depends on practical reason which is “reason, in the highest sense of the term, as the focal point of the Theoric and Practical, or as both in One” (SM 61 n). Practical reason presents to itself “*Ideas*, [that] in their conversion to the responsible Will, becomes Ultimate Ends” (AR 413). It indicates the possibility of doing our duty for its own sake as it brings about Ideas having dynamic power to realize the aim of those ideas of its own making. Practical reason accordingly represents “perfect freedom.” Theoretical or speculative reason is what enlightens the understanding to achieve “discourse of reason.” In Coleridge’s opinion, therefore, practical reason combining the speculative and practical is “a pure influence from the glory of the Almighty” (SM 69). It regenerates all other powers to ensure the “angelic happiness” originated in “Tri-unity, in Reason, Religion and Will.”

A Cambridge Platonist John Smith (1616–52) explains in one of his sermons, “The True Way or Method of Attaining to Divine Knowledge,” that to be “partaker of the Divine Nature” (II Peter 1: 4) we should “seek for God within thine own soul” by “an intellectual touch,” (129) that is, by the spiritual sense given by God in return for our faith:

When *Reason* once is raised by the mighty force of the Divine Spirit into a converse with God, it is turn’d into *Sense*: That which before was onely *Faith* well built upon sure Principles . . . becomes *Vision*. We shall then converse with God τῷ νοῷ, whereas before we convers’d with him onely τῇ δισκονοίᾳ with our *Discursive faculty*, as the *Platonists* were wont to distinguish. (140)

Like the Platonists, Coleridge distinguishes discursive reason, *dianoia*, between intuitive reason, *nous*. With intuitive reason, we grasp directly “a blissful, steady, and invariable sight of him” with “*Intellectual calmness* and serenity” (Smith 140). This “intellectual calmness” is what Coleridge describes as “angelic happiness” that consists in “the peace of God” apprehended by the conscience as “a spiritual sense” of those who “came closest to the goal/Whereto by Heaven’s grace man may attain.” That “angelic happiness,” however, is based upon or derived from the Kantian “human happiness” of regarding, by the conscience as “the inner judge of all free actions,” the inscrutable workings of moral feelings within as the effect of “some supernatural co-operation.”

Notes

1. Coleridge’s explanation of feelings in his confession of faith in 1817 at the age of forty-five is useful material to compare his concept of duty with that of Kant. Clause 3 in “S.T. Coleridge’s Confession of Belief with respect to the true grounds of Christian morality” goes:

I reject as erroneous, and deprecate as *most* dangerous, the notion, that our *Feelings* are to be the ground and guide of our Actions. I believe the Feelings themselves to be among the things that are to be grounded, and guided. The Feelings are effects, not causes; a part of the *instruments* of Action, but never can without serious injury be perverted into the *principles of Action*. < Under *Feelings* I include all that goes by the *names* of *Sentiment*, *Sensibility*, &c &c. . . . under proper discipline they are fitted to be both aids and ornaments of Virtue . . . > (SW I 570)

The word “feeling” was defined in *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana* (1818), the general introduction of

which was “A Preliminary Treatise on Method” by Coleridge, as “expressive of acute sensibility” and as “one of the five external senses, by which we obtain the ideas of solidity, hardness, softness, roughness, heat, cold, wetness, dryness, and other tangible quality.” Feelings control every sensuous impulse to get basic information for phenomenal experience for and from the Understanding; while emotion, defined as “applicable to the sensible and visible effects, which particular passions produce upon the frame,” seems to include various complicated feelings based on primary sensuous impulse.

In modern psychology, general feelings are divided into two: inferior and superior feelings. The former consists of just two feelings: the feelings of pleasure and that of pain. These two primary and intuitive feelings represent either positive pleasantness or negative unpleasantness but no reason for them can be defined. Superior feelings include love, joy, regret, anger, fear, hate and so on. They are consequences of strengthened inferior feelings and their reasons or motives are, to some extent, explainable. That is why they are called superior feelings. (from “Feeling,” *New Catholic Encyclopedia*).

Coleridge like Kant dealt mainly with the feeling of pleasure and pain that are substantial or fundamental causes of religion and morality (See e.g. CNIII#4005, “Introduction” to CJ).

2. See for instance, Muirhead, 219; B. Willey, 225; Boulger, 49; Barth, 7–8; Barfield, 8; Lockridge, 63; Vallins, 2–6. As the title of David Vallin’s recent book, *Coleridge and the Psychology of Romanticism: Feeling and Thought* (2000), suggests, Vallins analyzed thoroughly the philosophical reasons why Coleridge regarded the inseparableness of feelings and thoughts as important. However, he did not focus on the fact that Coleridge, Plato and Kant have many points in common on their concepts of the role of feelings in morality and religion.
3. As Perkins in *Coleridge’s Philosophy: The Logos as Unifying Principle* points out, “Coleridge himself constantly reaffirmed that the Logos of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel was an essential and fundamental ground of his system” (12). For Coleridge, faith in Logos is the most reliable means to cultivate Godlike infinite unity within.
4. S.Wake, “S.T. Coleridge and Platonic Revelation from Within (1),” *Kobe College Studies*, XLVI no.3 (2000): 85–107.
5. Plato’s Line simile illustrates the states of mind dealing with two realms: the visible world, ruled over by the Sun, and the intelligible world, ruled over by the Form of the Good. Plato divides a straight vertical line (AB) into two unequal sections: AC of the visible and CB of the intelligible order; and he cuts each section, AC and CB again in the same proportion, the proportion representing degrees of clarity and obscurity. We thus have four sections, from top to bottom, BE, EC, CD, DA. Plato allots four states of mind to the four parts of the line, intelligence or knowledge in the strict sense (*noesis*) to the highest part (BE), thinking or mathematical reasoning (*dianoia*) to the next (EC), belief or commonsense assurance (*pistis*) to CD, and illusion (*eikasia*) to the lowest part (DA). See Plato, *The Republic, Penguin Classics*, 309–311; R.C.Cross and A.D. Woodley, 201–206, 230.
6. Plato’s Θυμὸς is “the power of noble wrath” (*Republic* 439 E n). It is the spirited part which with rational and the appetitive parts forms human psyche (440 E–441 A). Θυμὸς helps reason by nature unless corrupted.
7. Basil Willey in “Coleridge and Religion” noted that “conviction of sin was, with [Coleridge], a precondition of the return to religion” (238), and quoted the following letter of Coleridge written in 1802 as the first clear statement that shows his return to the Trinity from Unitarianism:

My Faith is simply this—that there is an original corruption in our nature, from which and from the consequences of which, we may be redeemed by Christ—not as the Socinians say, by his pure morals or excellent Example merely—but in a mysterious manner as an effect of his Crucifixion—and this I believe—not because I *understand* it; but because I *feel*, that it is not only suitable to, but needful for, my nature and because I find it clearly revealed. (CLII 807)

What differs Coleridge from the Socinians is that he keenly felt the need of Redemption to accomplish good deeds (CNIII#3905). We cannot atone for our imperfect will single-handedly “by pure morals;” accordingly, Coleridge believed that to receive in an act of passiveness “the divine doctrine of the Trinity” (CLIII480), which is beyond our understanding but appeals to our feelings, constitutes Faith.

8. For *noesis*, see note 5 above.
9. For instance, see P Lects, 129.
10. This is taken from Coleridge’s definition of feeling in “S.T. Coleridge’s Confession of Belief” quoted fully in note 1. Douglas Hedley mentions in *Coleridge, Philosophy, and Religion* that, for Coleridge, the moral life requires divine aid: “The attempt to imitate the good is rooted in the renewing activity of the indwelling Logos. This is why Coleridge repeatedly appeals to the Delphic Oracle ‘Know Thyself: the task of philosophy is to reflect and turn within oneself and thus to transcend oneself and to ‘find’ God (9).
11. At the end of 1796, Coleridge, his wife Sara and young child Hartley moved to a small cottage in Nether Stowey in the Quantocks, Somerset. The cottage backed onto Thomas Poole’s orchard (Purton 26). Poole, then 32, was a well-to-do tanner and a liberal. He had founded Stowey Book Society and a Poor Men’s Friendly Society (Reggie Watters and Derrick Woolf, *Walking with Coleridge in the Quantocks: 1 Stowey*). Though Coleridge left Stowey for the Lake District in 1800 after his return from Germany, Poole continued helping the Coleridges practically and spiritually. Coleridge wrote in Stowey such poems as “The Raven,” “Frost at Midnight,” “This Lime-tree Bower my Prison,” “The Wanderings of Cain,” *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*, and part 1 of *Christabel*.
12. Coleridge was accompanied by the Wordsworths and a Stowey friend, John Chester, though he was not with Dorothy and William in Germany.
13. *Sophie’s World*, 271–73.
14. For Kant, “intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us” (CPR A 19, B 33) by means of sensibility. According to Kant, all human knowledge starts with intuitions yielded by sensibility, proceeds from thence to concepts by means of understanding, and ends with ideas of reason (CPR A 298/ B 355; A 702/B 730).
15. It was the second edition of CPR that Coleridge read (BL I 153 n).
16. *A priori* way of knowing means pure ways of knowing that are “absolutely independent of all experience” (CPR A 2/B 3)
17. See, for instance, “Kant, Immanuel” in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*.
18. Ernest Cassier in his *Platonic Renaissance in England* stressed that a Cambridge Platonist, Ralph Cudworth (1617–88) made this passage from *Theaetetus* (186 D–E) the real principle of his theory of knowledge (157). Also see John Spencer Hill, *Imagination in Coleridge*, 182 n. Coleridge referred to Cudworth’s *True Intellectual System of the Universe* (ed. Thomas Birch, 1678. 1743) in Lecture 1 on politics and religion in 1795 (Lects 1795, 94, 96, 98–99 and n). Cudworth’s Platonism helped Coleridge turn down Joseph Priestley and David Hartley’s necessitarian optimism (Lects 1795, 86 n) that made him say, “nothing . . . remains but the hypothesis of total Benevolence-Reasoning strictly and with logical accuracy I should deny the existence of any Evil” (105).
19. On regulative and constitutive principles Coleridge wrote, “Whether Ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant; or likewise CONSTITUTIVE, and one with the power and Life of Nature, according to Plato, and Plotinus . . . is the highest problem of Philosophy, and not part of its nomenclature” (SM 114). Constitutive principles “seek to bring the existence of appearances under rules *a priori*” (CPR A 179/B 221). According to the Kant of CPR, if the ideas of practical reason are used constitutively, they are liable to produce illusions. The regulative principles applied to practical reason do not “claim to constitute an object, nor to contribute directly to knowledge” (Caygill, 129–130)

20. A. Murray MacBeath wrote on the universality of moral feeling: “. . . moral feeling must be at least one essential element in the famous “fact of pure reason” which guarantees freedom of the will; but at the same time it is a feeling which is knowable *a priori*, which suggests that we do not need to experience it to know its reality” (285).
21. Coleridge’s explanation of “categorical imperative” in “Essay on Faith” (1820) also insists on the significance of reducing “a conflict of maxims” with the practical law:
- That I am conscious of a somewhat within me, *peremptorily* commanding me to do to others as I would that others should do unto me—in other words and in a more scholastic form, “a categorical (i.e. primary and unconditional) IMPERATIVE, . . . that the *Maxim* (=Regula Maxima or Supreme Rule) of my [Ac]tions both inward and outward should be such as I could, [witho]ut any contradiction arising therefore, will to be the Law of *all* moral and rational Beings (SW II 835)
- The categorical imperative not to have “contradiction in our beings” (PL 389) means we ought not contradict by disobeying objectives that are universal practical laws.
22. Coleridge wrote down this point in his notebook, “*It is not enough that we act in conformity to the Law of moral Reason—we must likewise FOR THE SAKE of that Law*” (CN I #1705).
23. “A spiritual Life” is “a Life, the actuality of which is not dependent on the material body, or limited by the circumstances and processes indispensable to its organization and substance” (AR 322).
24. According to Kant, evil exists not in inclinations, but in “that which determines the will^w as a free will^w,” which means in that we regard inclinations as representing an anatomy of the will (RL 52). I want to discuss Coleridge’s and Kant’s concepts of freedom, based on the relation between *die Wille* and *Willkür* in part III of this study.

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Abbreviations for the works of Coleridge

- AR : *Aids to Reflection*
- BL : *Biographia Literaria*
- CC : *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, general editor, Kathleen Coburn, Bollingen Series 75, Princeton UP, 1969—
- CL : Letter of Samuel Taylor Coleridge
- CM : *Marginalia*
- CN : *Notebooks*
- F : *The Friend*
- Lects 1795 : *Lectures 1795 on Politics and Religion*
- Lects 1808–1819 : *Lectures 1808–1819: On Literature*
- LS : *Lay Sermons*
- P Lects : *The Philosophical Lectures*
- PW : *The Complete Poetical Works*
- SM : *The Statesman’s Manual* in *Lay Sermons*
- S : *Shorter Works and Fragments*
- T : *Table Talk*

Abbreviations for the works of Kant

- CJ : *Critique of Judgement (Kritik der Urteilskraft)*
- CPR A : *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1st edition (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*)
- CPR B : *Critique of Pure Reason*, 2nd edition (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*)
- CPPr : *Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft)*
- GMM : *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten)*
- MM : *The Metaphysics of Morals (Die Metaphysik der Sitten)*

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