

# Humour and Satire in Jonathan Swift and the Tradition of Comickall Satyre

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*Vive la Bagatelle!*<sup>1</sup>

Jonathan Swift

Swift says in an essay in the *Intelligencer* that humour is "certainly the best Ingredient towards that Kind of Satyr, which is most useful, and gives the least Offence; which, instead of lashing, laughs Men out of their Follies, and Vices."<sup>2</sup> Whether humour is defined as a "disposition,"<sup>3</sup> or "a union of conscious with unconscious laughter,"<sup>4</sup> it is, to Swift, a useful weapon for his satire. He believes that it exempts his satire from the accusation of the abuse of satiric attack. Since the days of antiquity all satirists, including Archilochus, have been feared for their verbal abuses. Ben Jonson writes in his *Poetaster* of the power of satire equal to that of sorcery:

I could doe worse,  
Arm'd with Archilochvs fury, write *Iambicks*,  
Should make the desperate lashers hang themselues.  
Rime 'hem to death, as they doe *Irish* rats  
In drumming tunes.<sup>5</sup>

Archilochus is famous for the legend that, when Lycambes betrayed him, he wrote such a powerful piece of invective that he and his family hanged themselves for shame. Satire persuades a man to recognize his own wrong-doings. It is, indeed, an art of persuasion.<sup>6</sup> A much more refined satirist, Jonathan Swift, gives satire the analogy of "a sort of Glass, wherein Beholders do generally discover

every body's Face but their Own."<sup>7</sup> This glass imagery, with Henry Fielding, comes to be visualized in greater detail: the satiric mirror is to be held "to thousands in their closets, that they may contemplate their deformity, and endeavour to reduce it, and thus by suffering private mortification may avoid public shame."<sup>8</sup> The satirist perceives the deformity of man in body and mind or the incongruity between what man is and what man ought to be,<sup>9</sup> and takes the incongruity for the source of corruptions and evil;<sup>10</sup> he exposes, degrades, exaggerates, and holds it up to derision, so that the reader may be compelled to perceive it also, and measure himself and his behavior by the incongruity. If satire is to "laugh Men out of their Follies, and Vices," unlike Archilochus' direct invectives in the seventh century B. C., the association of satire and humour must have begun, somewhere in history, with satire adopting laughter for a useful weapon.

The same incongruity between what man is and what man ought to be is the chief material for the comic writer. Aristotle believed the risible to lie in any degradation from the normal, and to arise from the ludicrous—a kind of painless ugliness.<sup>11</sup> William Hazlitt declared the essence of the laughable to be the incongruous and the accidental contradiction between expectation and event. He distinguished the merely laughable from the ludicrous and the ridiculous: when the contradiction was heightened by deformity or inconvenience, he called it the ludicrous; he named the highest degree of the laughable the ridiculous, which departed from common sense and reason, and considered it as falling within the realm of satire.<sup>12</sup> Henri Bergson expanded the theory of incongruity and believed the comic to be derived from some loss of elasticity in man's mind and body, that is, what he called "something mechanical encrusted on the living,"<sup>13</sup> exemplified in self-ignorance, and automatism in situation, word, and character. For all these critics, ancient and modern, laughter was a social and moral discipline and its function was to perceive and expose in a somewhat shameful manner man's in-

adaptability to social life. Man's inability to live up to what is expected creates the same kind of incongruity between real and ideal as the satirist recognizes. Whether the laughter of comedy is relatively purposeless and casual and does not need the audience's participation in understanding the author's intention, or the laughter of satire is directed toward a preconceived end,<sup>14</sup> or it is an attack upon "discernible historic particulars,"<sup>15</sup> or "a game of wit" between the author and the spectator,<sup>16</sup> it is hard to tell comedy from satire for one reason that while comedy is a distinctive genre, a great deal of satire does not come within any category at all, or may as well be placed in one category as in another.<sup>17</sup> The difference, if we try to make one, is a matter of degree in purpose, feeling, and cooperation between the author and the audience, in the same way as Hazlitt justly defines the ridiculous as the "highest degree of the laughable," which belongs to satire. Both comedy and satire are ultimately estimated by common sense and the natural.

In their origins, in fact, comedy and satire show a close kinship. Satire was born of an attack on one's enemies through violent verbal abuse, which, the ancients believed, had magical power.<sup>18</sup> Out of satire, Aristotle believed,<sup>19</sup> comedy developed, and in Old Comedy the dramatists retained much of the satiric attack and ridiculed their enemies and those that they judged as enemies of the state, all in the name of morality.<sup>20</sup> In their early manifestations as well as in their later evolution, satire and comedy were related through ridicule and moral purposes, though they caused Plato to doubt about laughter as a social corrective by saying that the pleasure that one experienced in laughing came from the enjoyment of others' misfortune.<sup>21</sup>

In the Renaissance, when the dramatic form was taking shape in England, authors commonly thought of comedy as originating in satire. Sir Philip Sidney took ridicule for a useful social corrective and, under the influence of Aristotle,<sup>22</sup> defined comedy as "an imitatio of cōmon errors of our life which [the comedy writer] representeth in the most ridiculous & scornful sort that may be, so as it is

impossible that any beholder can be content to be such a one."<sup>23</sup> The importance of Ben Jonson in the tradition of comedy depends, not to speak of his realism, on his rediscovery of the medieval notion of the humours as the fit vehicle for comedy. Before Jonson took humours as his own, they had already been applied to the temperaments themselves to signify any pronounced tendency, "mood, condition, habit or eccentricity,"<sup>24</sup> or in eighteenth-century terms, "ruling passion." In the induction to his *Every Man out of his Humour* (1599), we read:

So in euery humane body  
The choller, melancholy, flegme, and bloud,  
By reason that they flow continually  
In some one part, and are not continent,  
Receiue the name of Humours. Now thus farre  
It may, by *Metaphore*, apply it self  
Vnto the generall disposition:  
As when some one peculiar quality  
Doth so possesse a man, that it doth draw  
All his affects, his spirits, and his powers.  
In their confluxions, all to runne one way,  
This may be truly said to be a Humour.<sup>25</sup>

With the humours came into comedy not only the idea of irreducible character and individuality, but a standardization of the types. To Jonson, however, the natural humour with which a man was born was not a proper object of ridicule, but of pity. What he attacked was affected humour. He explained his concept of affected humour in *Euery Man in his Humour* (1598):

It {Humour} is a gentleman-like monster,  
bred, in speciall gallantrie of our time, by  
affectation; and fed by folly.<sup>26</sup>

Jonson mercilessly exposed and ridiculed the disparity between what man is and what man affects to be, and he was recognized by Henry Fielding that Jonson understood the ridiculous best because Fielding believed that the ridiculous arises from affectation.<sup>27</sup> Jonson's men

in their humour are depicted, in visible terms, as mentally and physically deformed; unable to adapt themselves to the natural course of life, they behave like automatons to the extent that they are blinded by their "typical mania."<sup>28</sup> They are, as Robert Burton described, "torn in pieces, as *Actaeon* was with his dogs, and crucify their own souls."<sup>29</sup> The dramatist's theory of humour amounts to much the same thing as has been expressed by Bergson through his concept that laughter is driven from "something mechanical encrusted upon the living."

Jonson called his early comedies "Comicall Satyres"<sup>30</sup> and defined its purpose as "to sport with humane follies, not with crimes."<sup>31</sup> This principle not only established a long tradition of "exposure by ridicule"<sup>32</sup> in English satire but also definitely combined humour with satire for the first time. The satirist needed comic devices and the comic writer needed satiric lashing for moral ends. Both satire and comedy were connected by the ridiculous figures of humours which the audience watched with a sense of detachment and superiority, thinking that they were, at least, different from those caricature-like individuals, obviously deviated from the natural; for in the deformity of the actors of humours the spectators recognized "every body's Face but their Own." In Elizabethan usage, in fact, the humourist, meaning the artist whose material was the humours of others, was identical with the satirist.<sup>33</sup> The humourist can be said, then, to be one who has sharp eyes to see through incongruities in life and also the faculty to perceive and expose them as ridiculous.

The Restoration comedy writers, to the same degree as the Renaissance dramatists, were not satisfied with mere scurrilous laughter and buffoonery, for they insisted with Dryden that "Satire is of the nature of moral philosophy, as being instructive."<sup>34</sup> They adopted Jonson as a model and continued to employ ridicule as a weapon for the correction of the errors and affectation. It was, the dramatists of manners thought, satire that gave comedy its moral value, for they

believed that the purpose of comedy was to please and to instruct. Pope illustrated the moral enforcement of comedy through satire :

Here sunk Thalia [The Muse of Comedy], nerveless, cold,  
and dead,  
Had not her Sister Satyr held her head.<sup>35</sup>

At the hands of the new satirists of manners the "humourist" changed its meaning from the "satirist" to one who has a humour, and the deformity of humour was held up to severe derision. To Samuel Butler the "humourist" meant :

a peculiar Fantastic, that has a wonderful  
natural Affection to some particular Kind of  
Folly, to which he applies himself, and in  
Time becomes eminent. 'Tis commonly some  
out-lying Whimsie of *Bedlam*, that being tame  
and unhurtful is suffered to go at Liberty. . . .  
He knows no mean ; for that is inconsistent with  
all Humour, which is never found but in some  
Extreme or other.

Butler included religious fanatics in his concept of the "humourist,"<sup>36</sup> and whipped them as the proper objects of satiric ridicule.

The "exposure by ridicule" remained powerful in the eighteenth century, and ridicule was considered as an effective test of truth,<sup>37</sup> through the application of which man acquires insight into falsehood and moral and social deformity and perceives the reality of man falling from the natural. Henry Fielding affirmed the validity of the test of truth by saying that the ridiculous originates only from affectation, beneath which lie vanity and hypocrisy.<sup>38</sup> The test of ridicule ultimately pointed out, as Plato had already made clear, that affectation is the manifestation of extreme self-ignorance: if self-ignorance is "strong," we fear it, but if it is "weak," it is ridiculous.<sup>39</sup> It was Thomas Hobbes that combined ridicule as a social corrective to unmask self-ignorance with a sense of superiority. He said that laughter is "nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden

conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others, or with our own formerly."<sup>40</sup> He identified derisive laughter with self-congratulatory superiority to others' infirmities, based on his conception of human nature as having been motivated by self-interest and competition.<sup>41</sup> Hobbes' idea of laughter is the realization of Plato's suspicion of the malicious nature in laughter, and, in spite of the fact that laughter has been recognized as a social corrective, Hobbes' "sudden glory" has remained a horror to the theory of comedy.

As a matter of fact, such critics as Addison agreed to Hobbes' idea of laughter that "every one laughs at somebody that is in an inferior state of folly to himself,"<sup>42</sup> but the problem with such a laughter lay in its use. In the Age of Reason and Uniformitarianism initiated by Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism,<sup>43</sup> and when people emphasized the natural—the traditional elements of Western thought of good sense and decency inherent in the social body,<sup>44</sup> ridicule, accompanied by a sense of "sudden glory," served well for humiliating pride by publicly revealing one's self-ignorance and exposing the vicious separation between appearance and reality. It was a good social discipline as long as it was directed against those naturally deserving its lashing, and the self-esteeming spectator might feel, at a moment of self-knowledge, that he was not exempt from the same infirmity. But Addison and Steele and other eighteenth-century critics thought that ridicule was often employed in the wrong way, and fought against the abuses of an instrument that lent itself so easily to malicious laughter. The instrument was wit, which has been commonly interpreted as quick mental capacity with a stress on inventive literary expression:<sup>45</sup> for since the Restoration people had emphasized the refinement of language in the fashion set up by the salon of Mm. Rambouillet<sup>46</sup> in France and introduced to England by the court of Charles II. The witty manipulation of conversation had been made the most desirable quality, and sophistry through wit eventually undermined the instructive end

of laughter. Cuckold, fop, rake, cynical, gay, and debauched filled the stage, competing for a sense of "sudden glory" through wit, as a reflection of the artificial and indecent manners of the society of the day. Steele felt that "this unhappy affectation of being wise rather than honest, witty rather than good-natured, is the source of most of the ill habits of life."<sup>47</sup> "Wit," "ill-nature," and "sudden glory" became allied enemies to those who estimated the natural. Addison, in spite of his acceptance of Hobbes' laughter, thought that Hobbes' image of man, driven by self-love and competition, debased human nature and that it was ill-natured.<sup>48</sup> He wrote:

I am very much troubled when I see the talents of humour and ridicule in the possession of an ill-natured man. . . . His satire will then chiefly fall upon those who ought to be the most exempt from it. Virtue, merit, and everything that is praise-worthy, will be made the subjects of ridicule and buffoonery.<sup>49</sup>

*The Tatler* and *The Spectator* tried to convince people that the true satirist cannot be ill-natured nor abuse wit, and that good nature is an essential quality in the satirist.<sup>50</sup> Even Pope, who said, "I know nothing that moves strongly but satire, and those who are ashamed of nothing else are so of being ridiculous,"<sup>51</sup> affirmed such a contention:

*God-Nature* and *Good-Sense* must ever join;  
To Err is *Humane*, to Forgive, *Divine*.<sup>52</sup>

In the efforts to save ridicule and satire from ill-natured men and to temper the abuse of wit, humour as well as ridicule underwent a metamorphosis in proportion as the Age of Reason moved gradually toward the Age of Sensibility, and undermined its very foundation of Lockean sensationalism.<sup>53</sup> Though its basic definition as a particular quality, mood, or eccentricity of man's disposition was unchanged, humour became the expression of good nature and benign laughter, different from Jonson's concept of humour or Butler's deformed and treated as the targets of satiric ridicule and of "sudden

glory." The transformation was completed especially by the creation of Sir Roger de Coverley.<sup>54</sup> Steele pictured Sir Roger:

This humanity and good nature engages every body to him, so that when he is pleasant upon any of (his domestics), all his family are in good humour, and none so much as the person whom he diverts himself with.

I have observed . . . that my friend Sir Roger, amidst all his good qualities, is something of a humourist; and that his virtues, as well as imperfections, are as it were tinged by a certain extravagance, which makes them particularly his, and distinguishes them from those of other men. This cast of mind, as it is generally very innocent in itself, so it renders his conversation highly agreeable, and more delightful than the same degree of sense and virtue would appear in their common and ordinary colours.

He is a gentleman . . . very singular in his behaviour, but his singularities proceed from his good nature, and are contradictions to the manners of the world, only as he thinks the world is in the wrong. However, this humour creates him no enemies, for he does nothing with sourness or obstinacy; and his being unconfined to modes and forms, makes him but the readier and more capable to please and oblige all who know him.<sup>55</sup>

Thus humour is made synonymous with good sense and good nature: it is pleasant, generous, and sympathetic, and free and natural to oneself and one's behaviour unspoiled by affectation. The humourist's laughter is expressive of his amiable disposition and contagious among his company, and spreads sympathy and good will as "A cheerful heart is a good medicine."<sup>56</sup> Fielding perfected the meaning, implicit in the image of Sir Roger diverting himself, of laughter basically as "an action broken"<sup>57</sup> — a relief of tension through a sudden realization of the disparity between appearance and reality or incongruity with the natural: on one side of the break lie scorn and a sense to correct, on the other sympathy with human infirmities exemplified by the very disparity. While satire decrees, "Attack," humour mollifies, "Accept."<sup>58</sup> Fie[ding] proved that ridicule is not a

monopoly of "sudden glory" but a "wholesome physic for the mind," purging spleen and ill affection, that is, a relief of tension. He asserted :

Nay, I will appeal to common observation,  
whether the same companies are not found more  
full of good-humour and benevolence, after  
they have been sweetened for two or three hours  
with entertainments of this kind (burlesque),  
than when soured by a tragedy or a grave lecture.<sup>59</sup>

Though ridicule was still used as an interchangeable word for laughter by Fielding, Steele and Addison, the "discovery" of benign humour through the association of benevolent laughter and good humour made open the path<sup>60</sup> to the present-day connotation of humour, whether it signifies the laughing comforter of susceptibility,<sup>61</sup> or "thinking in fun while feeling in earnest."<sup>62</sup> Englishmen proudly claim humour as their own<sup>63</sup> and often cite the humour of Shakespeare in creating Falstaff, the fat, amorous rascal, deformed in body and mind, yet filled with pathos of growing old, weak, conscious that man is mortal.<sup>64</sup> Humour is today a full expression at once of man's quick mental faculty to perceive incongruity in life as ridiculous and absurd and of his sensible disposition to sympathize with others falling short of the expected, through love and tolerant and amused laughter, by knowing that he has the same defects in himself.

Jonathan Swift, who was bred in the atmosphere of the seventeenth century and matured during the Augustan Age, must have been strongly aware of the evolvment and effect of humour and ridicule in satire. He acknowledged the eighteenth-century predominance of humour over wit by saying that humour in its perfection is preferable to wit.<sup>65</sup> His "Epistle to Mr. Delany" explains Swift's concept of humour and the reason for his preference :

What humour is, not all the tribe  
Of logic mongers can describe ;

Here nature only acts her part,  
Unhelp'd by practice, books, or art :  
For wit and humour differ quite,  
That gives surprise, and this delight.  
Humour is odd, grotesque and wild,  
Only by affectation spoil'd :  
'Tis never by invention got,  
Men have it when they know it not.<sup>66</sup>

The surprise of wit is, to Swift, the result of artful invention and appeal to intelligence, while the delight of humour is natural and simple, unhelped by practice, books, and art. Humour is not to be explicated by the abstract categories of logic. Indeed, it is "in some Manner fixed to the very Nature of Man."<sup>67</sup> Though "humour" is "peculiar to [the English] language,"<sup>68</sup> Swift believed, a taste for humour is not only peculiar to the English nation but universal.<sup>69</sup> In the nature-art antithesis of humour and wit, Swift values the former more than the latter, in compliance with contemporary emphasis on the natural. Though we admit singularities of humour, as in Sir Roger, Swift's idea of humour—"odd, grotesque and wild" humour, only spoiled by affectation—carries some reminiscences of deformed images of Jonsonian figures of humours or of Butler's humourists, even if the deformity of his has not gone that far; for Sir Roger's humour certainly produces incongruities with the normal, but they are good-natured and amiable, far from being "odd, grotesque and wild." It is evident that by humour Swift means a disposition or tendency somewhat contradictory to the natural, which makes a man peculiar and for this very reason excites laughter in others, and at the same time the faculty to perceive the incongruities in a man as ridiculous. It seems that in Swift are associated the hard-tempered Elizabethan satirist and "the humourist," exempt from Hobbesian laughter in the eighteenth-century sense of the term.

Swift calls this odd humour the best ingredient for his satire, to expose and hold up to ridicule the chasm between appearance and

reality and between what man is and what he affects to be. He is, indeed, as Stuart Tave testified, in the tradition of Comical Satyre.<sup>70</sup> The employment of humour protects the satirist from offending people because he can depict and attack his targets as obviously deviated from the common course of life, with their reason overwhelmed by their humour, and as having lost the proper state of their existence as men. Whether or not James Feiblemen regards humour as a psychological reaction to the insuperable, a way of being "reconciled to defeat,"<sup>71</sup> Swift, by using humour, can create an esthetic and impersonal distance between his fictional world and the real world of the audience. As a matter of fact, Swift declares in his essay in the *Intelligencer* that the objects of his satiric ridicule are "Abuses" of things—the distortion of humanity through affection or, in other words, Plato's self-ignorance—which manifest themselves in corruptions in religion, politics, and laws,<sup>72</sup> beneath all of which lies uncontrollable humour. To Swift anything contradictory to the natural is evil and for this reason it becomes the proper target of ridicule, for to see evil figures moving around as loss of proper being, excites in men a sense of the ridiculous and gives a comic catharsis for intense feeling against such vices and corruptions as those in them. In the same essay where the writer discusses the purpose of writing satire, he mentions the satirist's "private Satisfaction" and "pleasure" without malice, along with his "publick Spirit" to mend the world. He justifies his idea of getting pleasure by stating, "If I ridicule the Follies and Corruptions of a *Court*, a *Ministr*, a *Ministry*, or a *Senate*, are they not amply paid by *Pensions*, *Titles*, and *Power*, while I expect, and desire no other Reward, than that of laughing with a few Friends in a Corner?"<sup>73</sup> The satirist's pleasure without malice proves right not only Swift's insistence on his laughter being different from that of ill-natured "sudden glory," but also his concept of ridicule as a purgation of indignation at the evil of the world. His desire to laugh with his few friends in a corner as the only reward for his work, however, certainly shows that Swift's own disposition

or humour is ironic as it is indicated in Aristotle's *Rhetorica* that the "ironical man" makes fun for his own private satisfaction, whereas the "buffoon" does so to amuse others.<sup>74</sup> Swift's ridicule also solidifies Alan Reynolds Thompson's definition of the "ironist" as a man who reflects, whenever he feels an impulse to act, that the reform is hopeless and rebellion perhaps worse than submission, though the ironist is by no means indifferent to the world:<sup>75</sup> for in addition to this above statement, Swift himself in his *Meditation on a Broomstick* has actually mocked at the vain pride of the reformer of the world as one whose rational faculty is topsy-turvy.<sup>76</sup>

Since eighteenth-century critics treated humour as vulgar, "under the Name of *low Humour*, or *low Comedy*,"<sup>77</sup> thinking, as Swift has said, that it is begotten of untutored nature, in order to raise and refine its invective ridicule for a gentleman's use, they employed the indirectness of delicate irony in the same sense as Aristotle designated it as a gentlemanly quality for the "ironical man" in contrast with the low-brow "buffoon."<sup>78</sup> Whether or not irony is the use of words to signify the opposite of what is said (verbal irony), or the feigning of ignorance (Socratic irony), or a condition of affairs contrary to expectation (dramatic irony, or irony of fate),<sup>79</sup> it is a rhetorical trope of dissimulation which enables the satirist to create and dramatize the disparity in character, word, and situation between what is and what ought to be, and urges the reader's participation in completing the satirist's meaning by penetrating through a subtle interplay of the surface expression and the implication beneath. As the fixed plot of Old Comedy consisted in the taking down of the Alazon, the Impostor who covers cowardice and folly under a vain pretense of bravery and wisdom, by the Eiron, the ironical man who feigns ignorance and self-depreciation,<sup>80</sup> the ironical devices are as much affiliated to comic ones as satire is to comedy, by manipulating the same incongruity between appearance and reality. But the time-lag in irony between the reader's perception of the *vehicle*, the surface meaning, and that of the *tenor*, the hidden one, is greater

and requires more of intellect than that in comedy. Irony also tends to neutralize all emotions and to turn all men into spectators of the human comedy.<sup>81</sup> Irony is, consequently, an ideal rhetorical tool for the satirist who should persuade the reader to see and apply the incongruities of life to his own behaviour and mind, without too much involvement in the infirmities of satiric targets.

Swift boasts that he himself was "born to introduce,/Refin'd it (irony) first, and show'd its Use."<sup>82</sup> One of the greatest examples of his refinement of irony lies in his manipulation of personae, if the use of fictional authors is the "largest ironical weapon of all."<sup>83</sup> Most of his works are written under the names of his personae. He is certainly unrivaled both in the number of personae that he adopts and in the imaginative completeness with which he merges himself with them. What he has perceived with the needle eye of his own humour as the incongruities in man he lets his personae expose to the most ridiculous light through the comic tools of degradation, self-ignorance, and automatism. Along with such devices he sheathes and draws the keen sword of irony and gives meaning to surface expression. The positions in which the personae stand in the ironic disparity between surface expression and hidden meaning, or between vehicle and tenor, is proportional to the degree of the humours, "odd, grotesque and wild," that Swift has endowed them with. Indeed, Swift's personae are all humourists—the Tale-Teller, Bickerstaff, Gulliver, the Modest Proposer—who, in spite of their deviations from the natural, make their triumphant appearance as chastisers of a world full of incongruities, while Swift is aware that he can expect as a reward for his works only to have some relief from his intense feeling against the evil. Much upon his ironic manipulation of humour and ridicule in his personae, not to speak of his targets, depends Swift's application to his satire, "without Offence," of his vigorous principle in the lineage of Comickall Satyre that loss of proper being is evil and should be ridiculed.

## Notes

1. Jonathan Swift, *The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, ed. F. Elrington Ball (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1910), IV, 316. All quotations from Swift's correspondence will be taken from this edition, which hereafter will be referred to as *Correspondence*.
2. Jonathan Swift, *Intelligencer*, No. 3, in *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, eds. Herbert Davis and Irvin Ehrenpreis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1939-1968), XII, 33. All quotations from Swift's prose works will be taken from this edition and will hereafter be cited as *Works*.
3. See *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* s. v. "humour."
4. Allardyce Nicoll, *The theory of Drama* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1931), p. 199.
5. Ben Jonson, *Poetaster*, in *Ben Jonson*, eds. C. H. Herford and Percy Simpson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), IV, 322. All quotations from Ben Jonson's plays are from this edition.
6. James Sutherland, *English Satire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 5; Edward W. Rosenheim, Jr., *Swift and the Satirist's Art* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 7.
7. Jonathan Swift, *A Full and True Account of the Battel Fought last Friday, &c.*, in *Works*, I, 140.
8. Henry Fielding, *The History of the Adventures of Joseph Andrews, and his Friend Mr. Abraham Adams*, ed. Martin C. Battestin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), p. 159.
9. Sutherland, p. 4. See also John M. Bullitt, *Jonathan Swift and the Anatomy of Satire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 3.
10. Sutherland, p. 4.
11. Aristotle, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts*, trans. S. H. Butcher (New York: Dover Publications, 1951), p. 21.
12. William Hazlitt, "On wit and Humour," in *The Collected Works of William Hazlitt*, ed. P. P. Howe (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1931), VI, 7-8.
13. Henri Bergson, *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the comic*, trans. Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell (New York: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 37, 16 & 32.
14. David Worcester, *The Art of Satire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 37-38.
15. Rosenheim, p. 31.
16. Worcester, p. 31.
17. C. E. Vulliamy, *The Anatomy of Satire* (London: Michael Joseph, 1950), pp. 6-10.
18. Robert C. Elliott, *The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual, Art* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3-6.
19. *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts*, p. 17.
20. Elliott, p. 165.
21. Plato, *Plato's Examination of Pleasure: A Translation of Philebus*, with

- Introduction and Commentary, trans. R. Hackforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), p. 97.
22. Gilbert Highet, *The Classical Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 123.
  23. Sir Philip Sidney, "Defense of Poesie," in *The Prose Works of Sir Phillip Sidney*, ed. Albert Feuillerat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), III, 23.
  24. John Palmer, *Ben Jonson* (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1934), p. 28.
  25. Ben Jonson, "Induction," *Euery Man out of his Humour*, in *Ben Jonson*, III, 431—432.
  26. Ben Jonson, *Euery Man in his Humour*, in *Ben Jonson*, III, 351.
  27. Fielding, p. 11.
  28. T. S. Eliot, *Selected Essays* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), p. 132.
  29. Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, ed. A. R. Shilleto (London: George Bell, 1926—27), I, 298.
  30. Elliott, p. 263. Cf. Oscar James Campbell, *Comicall Satyre and Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida* (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1965).
  31. Ben Jonson, "Prologue," *Euery Man in his Humour*, in *Ben Jonson*, III, 303.
  32. Bullitt, p. 37.
  33. Stuart M. Tave, *The Amiable Humourist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 92.
  34. John Dryden, "A Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire," in *Dryden: Of Dramatic Poesy and Other Essays*, ed. George Watson (London: Dent, 1962), II, 122.
  35. Alexander Pope, *The Dunciad*, in *The Twickenham Edition of the Poems of Alexander Pope*, eds. John Butt et al. (London: Methuen, 1956), V, 345. All quotations from Pope's poems are from this edition.
  36. Samuel Butler, *Characters and Passages from Note-Books*, ed. A. R. Waller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), p. 138.
  37. Tave, p. 28; Bullitt, p. 17. See Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc.*, ed. John M. Robertson (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1900), pp. 10 & 57—58.
  38. Fielding, p. 10.
  39. Plato, p. 96.
  40. Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic*, ed. Ferdinand Tonnies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), p. 32.
  41. Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan: or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealt Ecclesiastical and Civil*, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), pp. 63—69 & 80—84.
  42. Joseph Addison, *Spectator*, No. 47, in *The Spectator: with Notes, and a General Index* (New York: Samuel Marks, 1826). All quotations from *The Spectator* are from this edition.
  43. Descartes and Locke seemed to approach reason and human understanding from opposite directions ultimately to reach uniformitarianism. Reason to Des-

- cartes was the infallible intuition of the mind. He was highly optimistic about the ability of man's mind to reach the conclusion: "Good sense is of all things in the world the most equally distributed." René Descartes, *The Philosophical Works of René Descartes*, trans. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), I, 81. On the contrary, Locke maintained the skeptical belief that man's mind is radically limited, unable to create things or destroy those that have already existed, either by art or skill. John Locke, *Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Mary Whiton Calkins (Chicago: Open Court, 1917), p. 34.
44. Ricardo Quintana, *Swift: An Introduction* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 37.
  45. J. C. Gregory, *The Nature of Laughter* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1924), p. 131.
  46. See *The Encyclopedia Americana* s. v. "Rambouillet, Catherine."
  47. Richard Steele, *Spectator*, No. 6.
  48. Addison, *Spectator*, No. 588.
  49. *Ibid.*, No. 23.
  50. *Ibid.*, Nos. 103 & 385; Richard Steele, *Tatler*, No. 242, in *The Tatler with Illustrations and Notes, Historical, Biographical, and Critical* (London, 1786).
  51. Alexander Pope, *The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, IV, 290.
  52. Alexander Pope, "An Essay on Criticism," in *The Poems of Alexander Pope*, I, 197.
  53. Locke, pp. 58—59. Locke holds that the objects of sensible reality have two distinct characteristics, primary and secondary: the primary characteristics are objective and inherent in the object while the secondary exist only in the mind of the perceiver and so are more subjective than primary. Thus the Neoclassical antipathy to originality and subjective feeling embraced self-contradictions within from the start.
  54. Tave, p. 104. Cf. Corbyn Morris, *An Essay on Wit, Humour, Raillery, Etc.* (1744).
  55. Steele, *Spectator*, Nos. 106 & 2.
  56. *Proverbs, The Holy Bible: Revised Standard Version* (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1952), p. 505.
  57. Gregory, p. 158. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Kritik of Judgment*, trans. J. H. Bernard (London: Macmillan, 1892), p. 223.
  58. James K. Feibleman, *In Praise of Comedy: A Study in Its Theory and Practice* (New York: Horizon Press, 1970), p. 189.
  59. Fielding, p. 9.
  60. Max Eastman, *The Sense of Humour* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), pp. 165—166.
  61. George Meredith, *An Essay on Comedy and the Uses of the Comic Spirit*, ed. Lane Cooper (New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 134.
  62. J. B. Priestley, *English Humour* (London: Longmans, Green, 1933), p. 18.
  63. William Temple, "Of Poetry," in *Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century*,

- ed. J. E. Spingarn (London: Oxford University Press, 1908), III, 103—106. Temple asserts that humour is "a Vein natural perhaps to our Country" and "a Word peculiar to our Language too."
64. Cf. William Hazlitt, *Wit and Humour*; Louis Cazamian, *The Development of English Humour* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1952).
65. Swift, *Intelligencer*, No. 3, p. 32.
66. Jonathan Swift, "An Epistle to Mr. Delany," in *Collected Poems of Jonathan Swift*, ed. Joseph Horrell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), II, 586. All quotations from Swift's poems are from this edition.
67. Swift, *Intelligencer*, No. 3, p. 33.
68. Temple, p. 106.
69. Swift, *Intelligencer*, No. 3, p. 32.
70. Tave, pp. 116—117.
71. Feibleman, p. 189.
72. Swift, *Intelligencer*, No. 3, p. 33.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
74. Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, in *The Works of Aristotle*, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), XI, 7—9.
75. Alan Reynolds Thompson, *The Dry Mock: A Study of Irony in Drama* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1948), p. 255.
76. Jonathan Swift, "A Meditation upon a Broomstick," in *Works*, I, 240.
77. Swift, *Intelligencer*, No. 3, p. 33.
78. Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, pp. 6—7.
79. Thompson, p. 4.
80. Francis Macdonald Cornford, *The Origin of Attic Comedy*, ed. Theodor H. Castor (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), p. 120.
81. Worcester, p. 141.
82. Swift, "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift, D. S. P. D.," *Poems*, II, 721.
83. Ian Watt, "The Ironic Tradition in Augustan Prose from Swift to Johnson," *Restoration and Augustan Prose* (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 1956), p. 30.

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